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Abstract 
 
In the current context where the limited role for monetary policy instruments 
apparently endows fiscal policy with higher effectiveness, European fiscal policy 
authorities are rather constrained by the fact of most countries being struggling against 
recessions together with the need to put public finances in a sustainable path. 
In this context, we assess how large are fiscal multipliers in Europe, for both 
aggregated and disaggregated spending and revenue variables. Moreover, we analyze 
how cycle phases and fiscal consolidation episodes shape the size of fiscal multipliers. 
We present evidence for the Euro area, relying on a VAR model with pooled annual 
data for the current seventeen country-members, from 1998 to 2008. 
Estimation results show that, on average, public spending in the Euro area 
impinges negatively on impact, but the cumulative impact on output is positive while 
taxes, as expected, have (both impact and cumulative) negative impacts on output. On 
the expenditure side, transfers are the main driving force for the overall expenditure 
dynamics; moreover, wages exhibit negative impacts on output while positive effects 
are strongly driven by shocks in public investment and, to a lesser extent, by 
intermediate consumption. On the revenue side, all items impinge negatively on output 
growth. Additionally, openness reduces the effectiveness of public spending while it 
positively affects the size of the taxes multiplier. We have also found that the 
intertemporal budget constraint shapes a “more Ricardian” behavior on the European 
economic agents. 
As regards to how the size of fiscal multipliers changes across cycle phases, our 
results show that public spending multiplier is positive in recessions while in 
expansions is smaller, inclusively, negative. Similarly, the effectiveness of the taxes 
multiplier is, also, higher in recessions. 
Last but not the least, we have found that consolidation phases affect negatively 
the size of the multipliers. 
Keywords: Fiscal policy, Fiscal multipliers, Fiscal shocks, Business-cycle fluctuations, 
Public debt, Euro area, VAR analysis. 
JEL Codes: E32, E62, E65; H60.  
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Resumo 
 
No contexto atual, em que o papel dos instrumentos de política monetária se 
encontra limitado, seria de esperar que a política orçamental tivesse uma maior eficácia. 
Porém, as autoridades de política estão limitadas na sua atuação pelo facto de muitos 
países estarem a sofrer recessões e pressão para garantir a sustentabilidade da dívida. 
Neste contexto, avaliamos a magnitude dos multiplicadores orçamentais na 
Europa, em termos agregados e desagregados, para as variáveis da despesa e da receita. 
Analisamos também se as fases do ciclo e os episódios de consolidação orçamental 
influenciam a dimensão dos multiplicadores orçamentais. Apresentamos evidência para 
a área do Euro, com base num modelo VAR, com dados anuais (1998-2008) para todos 
os países-membros. 
Os resultados das estimações mostram que, para a área Euro, a despesa pública 
afeta negativamente o produto no impacto mas esse efeito é positivo em termos 
acumulados. Os impostos, como esperado, exibem (tanto no impacto como em termos 
acumulados) efeitos negativos sobre o produto. Do lado da despesa, as transferências 
são as responsáveis pela dinâmica da despesa global; os salários apresentam efeitos 
negativos no produto, enquanto os efeitos positivos são fortemente impulsionados por 
choques no investimento público e, em menor medida, pelo consumo público 
intermédio. Do lado da receita, todos os instrumentos influenciam negativamente o 
crescimento do produto. Adicionalmente, o grau de abertura comercial reduz a eficácia 
da despesa pública mas aumenta o impacto da receita sobre o produto. Concluímos 
também que a restrição orçamental intertemporal do setor público é ativa, tornando o 
comportamento dos agentes europeus mais ricardiano. 
Os resultados mostram ainda que o multiplicador da despesa pública é positivo 
em recessões, sendo menor em expansões, inclusivamente, negativo. Da mesma forma, 
a eficácia do multiplicador dos impostos é superior em recessões. 
Finalmente, conclui-se que as fases de consolidação afetam negativamente o 
tamanho dos multiplicadores. 
 
Palavras-chave: Política orçamental, Multiplicadores orçamentais, Choques de política 
orçamental, Ciclos económicos, Dívida pública, Área Euro, modelos 
VAR. 
Códigos JEL:  E32, E62, E65; H60.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the sequence of the recent global financial and economic crisis - classified by 
the literature as the most severe crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s -, 
monetary authorities of the developed countries have decided to reduce key interest 
rates in order to ensure not only financial stability, but also to smooth the impacts on 
real output and unemployment. Interest rates are now hitting the lowest levels ever and, 
thus, the ability of conventional monetary policy instruments to stimulate economic 
activity is substantially reduced. 
In this context, it is important to assess the efficiency of fiscal policy to 
overcome scenarios of recession or of rather slow growth in most of the Euro area 
countries. On the one hand, a “close-to-the-lower-bound” interest rate scenario is 
expected to endow fiscal policy with higher effectiveness. On the other hand, however, 
and according to data from the ECB (2012), only five out of the seventeen Euro area 
countries (Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland) exhibited a debt-to-
output ratio below that advocated by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 2011. 
Fiscal policy as a stabilizer is thus constrained by the widespread public finance 
disequilibria, in urgent need for a correction path. 
From both empirical and theoretical literature we find that, usually, fiscal 
consolidation periods are associated with recessions. Moreover, while the literature is 
rather ambiguous on how recessions affect the size of fiscal multipliers, the Academy 
provides evidence of smaller impacts on output from debt-correction measures during 
consolidation periods, providing even evidence on non-Keynesian effects when cuts are 
operated through certain expenditure measures, namely public wages. 
With the above-described scenario in background, this dissertation intends to 
assess how large are fiscal multipliers in Europe and for different fiscal policy 
instruments. In particular, we compute multipliers on the revenue side – covering for 
social security contributions, direct and indirect taxes – and on the expenditure side – 
public wages, intermediate consumption, transfers and investment. Moreover, we aim at 
contributing to the (rather sparse) literature on the size of multipliers across cycle 
phases or under specific periods of policy shifts, such as the fiscal consolidation 
episodes. Evidence is presented for the Euro area. 
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Among the relevant literature we found three main methodologies that can be 
used to assess the effectiveness of fiscal policy: (i) large structural macroeconomic 
models such as the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models; (ii) case 
studies; and, (iii) Vector Autoregression (VAR) approaches. We propose to compute 
fiscal multipliers from estimations produced using a panel-data VAR approach. In 
particular, we compute the average impact and cumulative effects of fiscal policy on 
output for the Euro area, using annual data for the current seventeen country-members, 
from 1998 to 2008. We use 1998 as the starting year because, in spite of no formal 
monetary union, the convergence admission criteria were already established and 
monitored by then. The year 2008 was set as the final year of our sample as to exclude 
the economic and financial crisis turmoil; the inclusion of the recent years in such a 
small sample would certainly produce, due to outlier observations, biased results 
relative to regular empirical evidence.
1
 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide a review of the 
theoretical mechanisms and empirical evidence on the size of fiscal multipliers; in 
particular we review the main mechanisms that shape the size of fiscal multipliers 
across cycle phases and during consolidation processes. After a brief description of the 
methodology and the data used (section 3) we provide empirical evidence for the Euro 
area in section 4. We compute different-instrument fiscal multipliers, accounting either 
for structural specificities, such as the degree of openness, the size of the debt-to-output 
ratio and the periods under fiscal consolidation. Multipliers are also computed for 
expansions and recessions. Finally, we present the concluding remarks in section 5.  
                                                 
1
 Results obtained by policymakers in response to the crisis were not as expected and the reliability of 
models used was called into question. For further details, see Ramey (2011) and Perotti (2011). 
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2. Theoretical mechanisms and empirical evidence on the 
size of fiscal multipliers – a review 
 
There is now a substantial amount of literature exploring, both theoretically and 
empirically, how the size of fiscal multipliers changes according to several factors, such 
as the degree of openness, the alternative fiscal instruments used or other 
structural/institutional features governing the economies. Instead, to a rather small 
extent, the literature also explores how the size of the multipliers changes across cycle 
phases or with specific structural policy regime shifts such as fiscal consolidation 
processes. These latter scenarios are crucial for the analysis of the current European 
economic environment, where the efforts to struggle against a strong recession and to 
provide public support to the financial sector have had strong negative effects on public 
debt dynamics of most of the countries. 
In what follows, we will review the literature on the main channels affecting the 
size of fiscal multipliers. For most of the standard results we will rely on 
macroeconomic manuals of general acceptance, namely on Burda and Wyplosz (2009) 
and Gordon (2012), as well as on previous literature reviews, namely those provided by 
Briotti (2005), Spilimbergo et al. (2009) and Hebous (2011). 
 
 
2.1. General determinants of the size of multipliers 
 
The fiscal multiplier is the most commonly used measure to assess the 
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus to output. Fiscal multiplier is defined as the ratio 
between the change in output and an exogenous change in a given fiscal variable. There 
are as many multipliers as the number of items composing the government budget, at 
different disaggregation levels – e.g., tax multipliers or current government spending 
multipliers. 
Fiscal multipliers are also computed according to different time horizons for 
assessing the impacts on output, usually referred as impact and cumulative multipliers. 
The impact multiplier measures the impact on output from a change in fiscal variables 
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in the period in which the impulse to government expenditure/revenue occurs. The 
cumulative multiplier refers to the cumulative change in output per unit of additional 
government expenditure/revenue, i.e., computes contemporaneous as well as lagged 
effects on output produced by a shock in any fiscal variable. Cumulative multipliers are 
specially required in order to correct for persistent fiscal shocks. 
Usually, Keynesian and New-Keynesian models predict that discretionary 
expansionary fiscal policies (e.g., rises in government spending or cuts in taxes), by 
stimulating aggregate demand, produce an increase in output.
2
 There is also a positive 
response of private consumption to government expenditures, which is explained as a 
result of the strong dependence of consumption on current disposable income. All these 
effects are, however, very different across models with different assumptions 
characterizing different structural behavior or institutional environments. 
Using the simple Keynesian model, a static model characterized by sticky prices, 
slack productive capacity, fixed interest rate, and that is typically used to describe a 
closed (or a large, rather closed) economy in the very short-run, the value of the fiscal 
multiplier is positive and larger than one. The size of fiscal multiplier is larger the larger 
the marginal propensity to consume and the larger the sensitivity of private investment 
to income. 
The marginal propensity to consume is higher when consumers do not take fully 
into account of the increase in future taxes to compensate for current debt increases, 
either because of finite horizon, or simple myopia, or when consumers face liquidity 
constraints. All these factors that potentially explain why private consumption moves 
alongside with current disposable income and less with net wealth. 
Ceteris paribus, since the effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on the marginal 
propensity to consume, stimulus packages should have a higher government spending 
component relative to tax cuts; the first round effect on demand is immediate when 
expenditure increases, while under a tax cut (part of) the increase in disposable income 
is saved and not directly spent by individuals. Thus, expenditure-side multipliers are 
expected to be larger than revenue-side multipliers (see Appendix A.1. for an analytical 
assessment comparing both multipliers). 
                                                 
2
 New-Keynesian models differ from Keynesian models as the former include microeconomic 
foundations and rational forward-looking expectations rather than backward-looking expectations. 
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Also, the larger the impacts of income on investment decisions, i.e., the stronger 
the accelerator effect is, the larger are fiscal multipliers. 
In the weak Keynesian models (e.g., IS-LM or IS-TR models for a closed 
economy and the IS-LM/TR-BP models for an open economy)
3
 - those under sticky 
prices but with money market and international dependence in terms of goods, services 
and financial markets – several factors limit the size of fiscal multipliers. The value of 
the multiplier is smaller than in the simple Keynesian model, but still positive.    
In the closed economy frameworks, the impact of fiscal multipliers on output is 
limited by the decline in private demand, namely in private investment, since 
expansionary fiscal policies put upward pressure in interest rates (crowding-out effect).
4
 
The degree of crowding-out is larger the larger the sensitivity of private investment to 
the real interest rate. Moreover, the crowding-out is larger, the larger the elasticity of 
money demand relative to output and/or the smaller the semi-elasticity of money 
demand to the interest rate (IS-LM model) or the less monetary authority reacts to 
economic upturns (IS-TR model). 
Several studies (e.g., Spilimbergo et al., 2009) show that accommodative 
monetary conditions can increase the size of multipliers by a factor of two to three. On 
the contrary, under plausible assumptions the multiplier is zero if monetary policy 
firmly targets inflation or nominal income. 
Comparatively with a closed economy (large country), in a small open economy 
the size of fiscal multiplier is smaller the larger is the marginal propensity to import. 
Expansionary fiscal policies originate short-run increases in imports and this effect is 
stronger the more (import) open economies are. Moreover, the external relations of a 
small country also shape the size of fiscal multipliers as they differ across exchange rate 
regimes, with the degree of capital mobility and with the level of development of 
monetary and financial markets. 
The size of multiplier is larger if monetary conditions are accommodative. In a 
small open economy under a fixed exchange rate regime, fiscal expansion puts upward 
                                                 
3
 See, for instance, Burda and Wyplosz (2009) for a synthetic view of these models. 
4
 Using, for instance, the IS-LM model (closed economy for simplification), an increase in output, 
resulting from and expansionary fiscal policy, leads to an increase in real money demand, pushing up 
interest rates. An alternative approach is the IS-TR model, in which the monetary authority, following an 
interest rate feedback rule on the output gap (simple version of the Taylor rule), increases the interest 
rates as the output gap expands.  
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pressure on the exchange and the interest rates.
5
 As money supply increases as to defend 
the fixed exchange rate parity, an increase in output occurs with a smaller crowding-out 
effect. Hence fiscal policy under this scenario is more effective in stimulating output 
than for a large, rather closed, country. 
In contrast, in a small open economy under a flexible exchange rate regime, 
fiscal policy is less effective. A fiscal expansion puts upward pressure on the interest 
rate; as capital flows into the economy, the demand for domestic currency increases and 
the domestic currency appreciates. Because prices are sticky, this nominal appreciation 
is mapped to a real appreciation, and consequently net exports decline. This negative 
effect on the trade balance limits the expansionary effect of fiscal policy, and so fiscal 
policy in small open economies under flexible exchange rate regimes affects output by 
less than in large, rather closed, economies. 
Moreover, the effects of the exchange-rate channel are reinforced for higher 
degrees of capital mobility. Perfect mobility of capital implies that assets denominated 
in domestic currency and in foreign currency are perfect substitutes - as long as 
domestic interest rate compensates for foreign interest rate and for expected exchange 
rate changes, assets denominated in both currencies are hold. In this scenario, currency 
exchange is unlimited, costless and immediate. 
So, under a fixed exchange rate regime and perfect capital mobility, capital 
flows are reinforced in response to interest rate differentials, offsetting them, in the 
sequence of a fiscal policy. Thus, no crowding-out (in) applies and fiscal policy has 
maximum impacts on output. On the other hand, under flexible exchange rates, 
exchange-rate crowding-out (in) perfectly offsets the impacts of fiscal policy on output 
– fiscal multiplier tends to zero. 
Another factor from which the size of the fiscal multipliers depends on is the 
degree of financial market development. It has, however, ambiguous effects on the size 
of multipliers, depending on how the degree of financial development affects liquidity 
constraints and on the government’s ability to finance its fiscal deficit. 
Usually, a lower degree of financial development imposes liquidity constraints 
which limit the ability for consumption (and investment) smoothing. The values of the 
fiscal multipliers are, thus, expected to be larger (Spilimbergo et al., 2009). 
                                                 
5
 In this dissertation we assume that an increase in exchange rate means an appreciation of the domestic 
currency. 
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Regarding government’s ability to finance the fiscal deficit, the impacts of 
government financing on interest rates also depends on the degree of financial 
development. In countries with limited access to financial markets, governments can 
issue debt to finance the deficit only at very high interest rates, which dampens the size 
of multipliers. However, if in those countries governments issue bonds to “captive” 
domestic savers, thereby lowering the costs of financing, the size of the decrease of 
fiscal multipliers can be restricted. 
For the sake of concreteness, collect the above-described mechanisms into the 
analysis of policy and “spillover” effects arising from interdependent economies. 
Consider, as an example of policy co-ordination, the scenario of a monetary union with 
high capital mobility and well developed financial markets. In this context, fiscal policy 
externalities may arise, although moving in opposite directions. 
A fiscal stimulus will increase domestic output but it will lead to additional 
imports from trading partners boosting the income of the latter (trade channel). At the 
same time, if the country (or group of countries) where the fiscal shock occurs is large 
enough, the policy puts upward pressure on the union’s interest rates. This, in turn, has a 
contractionary effect on both domestic and foreign output (interest rate channel). 
Additionally, as the exchange rate of the union currency floats against the rest of 
the world, a fiscal expansion in a (large) member economy causes an appreciation of the 
common currency, worsening all member-countries’ trade balances. 
Cwik and Wieland (2011) find that spillovers between Euro area countries are 
negligible or even negative, because direct demand effects are offset by the indirect 
effect of the adjustment in the euro exchange rate. 
In the same veil, a fiscal expansion in the Euro area, through changes in the 
exchange rate, boosts the non-member countries’ exports and output. There is a 
locomotive effect between economies under flexible exchange rates, with both domestic 
and foreign output expansion in the sequence of a fiscal stimulus. 
In contrast, under a fixed exchange rate regime, between its currencies an 
expansionary fiscal policy on one country requires an increase in the foreign interest 
rate, leading to a decrease in the output of the partner countries. Summing up, there is a 
negative transmission effect between economies, usually known as a beggar-thy-
neighbor effect. While the output of a country increases, output of the anchored 
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countries decreases. This effect can be smaller or, eventually, reverted if the income 
feedback effect through increase of exports is strong enough. 
A more recent generation of models includes dynamic models with rational 
expectations and infinitely-lived agents. The crucial contribution of these models is that 
the range of potential transmission channels for fiscal policy to aggregate demand is 
broader under a longer time horizon. In this scenario, agents form expectations 
regarding future developments in public finances and budget policies, and hence their 
future disposable income and wealth. The intertemporal optimization implies complex 
and non-linear relationships for consumption and investment, which depend, among 
other things, on how economic agents form their expectations. Due to wealth effects on 
consumption, this aggregate demand component is one of the most affected by these 
assumptions. Considering forward looking agents, and no liquidity constraints, the 
Ricardian Equivalence proposition may hold
6
  - there is a precautionary behavior of 
economic agents that fully offset fiscal policy changes, and the value of the multiplier 
may converge to zero. 
 Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, as the New-
Keynesian (NK) and the Real Business Cycle (RBC) ones, are examples of this type of 
framework. Both models predict a short-run expansion in output in the sequence of 
discretionary expansionary fiscal policies but a decrease in private consumption 
operating through a negative wealth effect attached to higher current government 
expenditures. The difference is that RBC models predict an increase in investment that 
more than compensates the fall in consumption (e.g., Baxter and King, 1993) while NK 
models tends to exhibit investment crowding-out.  
In RBC models the negative wealth effect leads to a decline in consumption 
whereas interest rate, saving and labor supply increase.  
The rise in hours worked, in turn, causes real wages to fall whereas investment 
increases. This described fiscal policy transmission is in force whether the rise in 
government spending is permanent or persistent. The intuition behind the increase in 
                                                 
6
 The concept of Ricardian Equivalence was revived by Barro (1974) and means that a tax 
cut/expenditure increase financed by issuing government debt may fail to stimulate private consumption, 
because consumers discount the future tax burden required to debt service and repayment, and so increase 
their savings accordingly and no impact on output occurs. 
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investment is that a higher steady-state level of hours worked requires initially higher 
investment to build up additional capital stock.  
In contrast, in a NK model, after a positive shock to government consumption 
real wages increase. This is because the resulting increase in output raises the demand 
for labor which, in the NK setup, offsets the increase in the labor supply due to the 
negative wealth effect. As regards to investment, in NK models with capital 
accumulation, an increase in government spending raises the interest rate and crowds-
out private investment. 
Increases in output result from the effects of fiscal stimulus on the supply side in 
RBC models, while they operate under the demand side in NK models. Additionally, 
both models predict only temporary output effects from fiscal stimulus. In the NK 
models, as time passes, prices adjust upwards and, in the medium-to-long run, fiscal 
shocks affect nominal but no real variables. In RBC models, only in long run permanent 
effects on output occur through changes in supply-side. These effects are captured by 
the cumulative fiscal multipliers. 
 
 
2.2. Empirical evidence on the size of multipliers 
 
In the remainder of this subsection we propose to review most of the empirical 
results in the literature, while comparing them with the theoretical expected outcomes 
described above. There is a huge amount of empirical work on the assessment of the 
size of fiscal multipliers. Deliberately, we will focus on those using the most standard 
methodology, namely the vector autoregression (VAR) framework. Moreover, as 
several literature reviews have been frequently produced (see, for instance, Briotti 
(2005), Spilimbergo et al. (2009) and Hebous (2011)), we will focus mainly on more 
recent papers.  
Table 1 briefly reviews some of the most relevant papers of this strand of 
literature, complemented by some recent studies on the impacts on output from fiscal 
stimulus. 
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Table 1: Fiscal multipliers in literature  
Fiscal 
Instrument / 
Composition 
 
Effects 
on 
output 
Size-range for 
multipliers 
Author Methodology Sample 
Impact Cumulative 
Public 
spending 
(total) 
Positive 
1.68 
1.21 
(10 years) 
Pereira 
and 
Sagalés 
(2011) 
 
VAR 
(Cholesky 
decomposition) 
 
Portugal 
(1980-
2005) 
 
0.1 
 
0.2 
(5 years) 
 
Fatás and 
Mihov 
(2001) 
 
VAR 
(Cholesky 
decomposition) 
 
U.S. 
(1960- 
1996) 
 
0.75 
 
0.02 
(5 years) 
 
Burriel et 
al. 
(2010) 
 
VAR 
(Structural 
approach) 
 
U.S. 
(1981Q1-
2007Q4) 
 
< 1 
Afonso 
and 
Sousa 
(2012) 
VAR 
(Bayesian 
structural 
approach) 
U.S. 
(1970Q3-
2007Q4) 
 
U.K. 
(1964Q2-
2007Q4) 
 
Germany 
(1980Q3-
2006Q4) 
 
Italy 
(1986Q2-
2004Q4) 
 
Negative 0.65 
 
-2.24 
(5 years) 
 
Mountford 
and Uhlig 
(2009) 
 
Sign 
restrictions 
U.S. 
(1955-
2000) 
 
Ambiguous 
0.8 
 
-0.24 
(5 years) 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 
(2002) 
 
VAR 
(Structural 
approach) 
 
U.S. 
(1947Q1-
1997Q4) 
 
 
0.4 
 
-0.2 
(4 years) 
Agnello 
et al. 
(2011) 
Econometric 
approach 
(2SLS) 
 
Panel of 
132 
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countries 
(1960-
2008) 
Taxes 
(total) 
Positive      
Negative 
0.00 
 
-1.83 
(10 years) 
Pereira 
and 
Sagalés 
(2011) 
VAR 
(Cholesky 
decomposition) 
Portugal 
(1980-
2005) 
 
-1.4 
 
 
-0.4 
(5 years) 
 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 
(2002) 
VAR 
(Structural 
approach) 
U.S. 
(1947Q1-
1997Q4) 
 
 
Public 
Investment 
 
Positive 
 
 
2.44 
 
 
 
4.69 
(10 years) 
Pereira 
and 
Sagalés 
(2011) 
VAR 
(Cholesky 
decomposition) 
Portugal 
(1980-
2005) 
 
Wage 
expenditure 
Negative 
0.33 
 
-2.68 
(10 years) 
Pereira 
and 
Sagalés 
(2011) 
VAR 
(Cholesky 
decomposition) 
 
Portugal 
(1980-
2005) 
 
< 0 
7
 
Alesina 
and 
Ardagna 
(2010) 
Case study 
OECD 
countries 
(1970-
2007) 
-0.48 
-2.56 
(5 years) 
Alesina 
et al. 
(2002) 
VAR 
(Cholesky 
decomposition) 
OECD 
countries 
(1960-
1996) 
Direct taxes Negative -0.1 
-2.78 
(10 years) 
Pereira 
and 
Sagalés 
(2011) 
VAR 
(Cholesky 
decomposition) 
Portugal 
(1980-
2005) 
 
 
Fatás and Mihov (2001) compare the dynamic impacts of fiscal policy on 
macroeconomic variables implied by a typical RBC model with the empirical results 
                                                 
7
 Alesina and Ardagna (2010) do not compute the size of fiscal multipliers, they only compare the effects 
of different compositions of major fiscal changes. 
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from an identified vector autoregression, using quarterly data from 1960Q1 to 1996Q4 
for the U.S. They find strong and persistent increases in private consumption and 
employment in response to rises in government expenditures. This is inconsistent with 
theoretical benchmark of RBC models where private consumption falls in response to 
rises in government expenditures. Another discrepancy between the model and the 
empirical results is that while empirical results show a positive conditional correlation 
between consumption and employment, in the theoretical benchmark these variables 
move in opposite directions.  
Overall, their results show that increases in government spending are 
expansionary with residential investment being the main driving force for the persistent 
rise in output. In a more disaggregated analysis they find that the increase in 
government spending is followed by a persistent rise in all components of consumption 
(durable goods, nondurables goods and services). Investment also increases, but only 
within a lag of six quarters, returning to trend after three years.  
This evidence on the dynamics of investment goes against the Keynesian view 
and favors the classical (RBC) approach. 
In contrast, Alesina et al. (2002), using a panel of OECD countries and covering 
data from 1960 to 1996, show that there is a negative effect of government expenditures 
on investment (crowding-out effect of fiscal policy), being this negative effect mainly 
associated to increases in government wages. A possible reason for this effect is that 
increases in wages in the public sector stimulate unions pressure for wage increases in 
the private sector, which have negative impact on profit margins and, consequently, on 
private investment. 
Afonso and Sousa (2012) analyze recent empirical evidence for the U.S., the 
U.K., Germany, and Italy, respectively, for the periods 1970Q3-2007Q4, 1964Q2-
2007Q4, 1980Q3-2006Q4, and 1986Q2-2004Q4. They use a bayesian structural vector 
autoregression approach with a recursive identification scheme to identify fiscal policy 
shocks. They conclude that government spending shocks have, in general, a small effect 
on GDP; they do not impact significantly on private consumption and have a negative 
effect on private investment (evidence for the NK approach). 
Another recent paper in this domain is Pereira and Sagalés (2011) who, besides 
analyzing the effects of expenditure-side fiscal policies, as the previous recorded studies 
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do, also analyze the impacts, both at aggregate and disaggregate levels, of revenue-
based fiscal policies. The authors consider four components on the spending side: 
current transfers, intermediate public consumption, wages and public investment; and 
two components on revenue side: direct and indirect tax revenues. Using the Cholesky 
decomposition for shock identification, the cumulative impulse-response functions are 
drawn for Portugal and rely on a sample covering the period from 1980 to 2005. 
At the aggregate level, results show that revenue-side is more effective than 
spending-side fiscal policies in affecting output. By definition, an increase in taxes does 
not produce contemporaneous effects in output (impact multiplier is 0); although, an 
intertemporal accumulated effect in output is estimated in -1.83 (cumulative multiplier). 
In contrast, an increase in public spending produces contemporaneous effects in output 
(impact multiplier is of 1.68) while the cumulative multiplier is 1.21. This suggests 
important short-term demand effects and negligible longer-term effects. Indeed, the 
response of output becomes insignificant after five years. Moreover, these results go 
against the Keynesian theory which postulates that the tax multiplier is (in absolute 
value) smaller than the spending multiplier. 
At a more disaggregated level, results in Pereira and Sagalés (2011) show that, 
among the spending-side components, public investment, wages, current transfers and 
intermediate public consumption exhibit, respectively, the highest through the lowest 
multiplier value. However, and in spite of the barely positive impact on output, wages 
have a negative cumulative multiplier estimated in 2.68. For the remaining 
expenditures, impact (and cumulative) multipliers range from 2.44 (4.69) for public 
investment to 0.27 (0.62) for intermediate consumption. As in the case of expenditure 
on wages, transfers also imply transition negative impacts on output. These results are 
with the Keynesian theory with exception of those observed for the compensation of 
employees; in this case, results go in line of those found by Alesina et al. (2002). 
On the revenue side, direct taxes have stronger impacts on output than indirect 
taxes, with impact (and cumulative) multipliers of -0.1 (-2.78) and -0.06 (-0.18), 
respectively. The smaller effect of indirect taxes in output is explained by the large 
weight of consumption taxes in indirect taxes in Portugal together with consumption 
patterns and habits relatively price-inelastic; thus, indirect taxes have not significant 
effects on aggregate demand. 
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As for evidence on how structural or institutional factors shape the size of 
multipliers, we found evidence covering for the exchange rate regime, the degree of 
openness and the level of public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Table 2 show the results found by Ilzetzki et al. (2011) for government spending 
multiplier across different scenarios: exchange rate regimes, openness trade degree and 
financial fragility. 
 
Table 2: Government spending multiplier across different scenarios 
Fiscal 
Instrument 
Transmission 
Channel 
Cumulative Multiplier 
 
Public 
spending 
Exchange rate 
regime 
Fixed Floating 
1.5 0 
Openness trade 
degree 
“Closed” Economy (<60% 
GDP) 
“Open Economy” 
(> 60% GDP) 
1.2 -0.47 
Financial fragility 
High debt (debt-to-GDP ratio > 60% GDP) for 3 (or 
more) consecutive years 
-2.3 
Source: Ilzetzki et al. (2011). 
 
Ilzetzki et al. (2011) analyze the role of the exchange rate regime in size of the 
fiscal multipliers. They find that the choice of the exchange rate regime is relevant to 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Using a panel VAR framework, they estimate sizeable 
(long-run) multipliers in countries under fixed exchange rates (1.5), while multipliers 
are zero in countries under floating exchange rates. This empirical evidence supports the 
conclusions of the Mundell-Fleming model which predicts that the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy increases as the exchange rate regime becomes more rigid. 
In another recent study, Born et al. (2012) estimate a VAR that suggests a short-
run multiplier of about 1.2 under fixed exchange rates and 0.75 under floating exchange 
rates. Hence, the multiplier differs across exchange rate regimes – but to a lesser extent 
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than the reported in earlier studies. However, the dynamics of the exchange rate and net 
exports provide little support to the fiscal transmission mechanism at the heart of the 
Mundell-Fleming model. In their analysis, under the assumption that government debt is 
riskless, a small open economy framework cannot account for cross-country spillover 
effects. In the presence of sovereign risk the multiplier is likely to be smaller relative to 
“normal” times8 if monetary policy is constrained (Corsetti et al., 2012a) as such 
spillovers may be sizeable, notably within monetary unions (Corsetti et al., 2011). 
Also, the dynamics of the real exchange rate may differ systematically across 
currency regimes. A slightly appreciation of the real effective exchange rate followed 
by a depreciation over time is a behavior described by the literature after a rise in 
government spending; recent studies, however, document a fall in the real exchange rate 
after a rise in government spending in flexible exchange rate regimes. In contrast, 
studies focusing on fixed exchange rate regimes tend to document real appreciation in 
response to positive spending shocks (Corsetti et al., 2012a). 
Regarding the degree of openness, Ilzetzki et al. (2011) conclude that it is also a 
relevant variable for the effectiveness of fiscal policy. In line with the theoretical 
models, more closed economies, i.e., economies with a degree of openness
9
 below 60% 
of GDP, present higher multipliers than small open economies. They found that the 
government spending multiplier is larger in more closed (large) economies relative to 
small open economies, with an impact multiplier of 0.02 in the former and -0.19 in the 
latter and a long-run multiplier of 1.29 in the former and -0.47 in the latter. This 
difference is statistically significant on impact, but not at longer horizons. 
Last but not the least, Ilzetzki et al. (2011) analyze how the level of public debt-
to-GDP influences the multiplier. Results obtained show that for countries with a debt-
to-GDP ratio above 60%, the cumulative, expenditure-side, expansionary fiscal policies 
have negative effects on output. They estimate a long run multiplier of -2.3.  Recently, 
Corsetti et al. (2012b) found that in “good” times, fiscal balances and private 
consumption co-move negatively while in “bad” times10, with high levels of public 
debt, the co-movement becomes positive - a set of results partially supporting non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. 
                                                 
8
 In this context “normal” times refers to a non-recession period. 
9
 Ilzetzki et al. (2011) calculate degree of openness as 
                 
   
. 
10
 In this context “good” times mean an expansion period and “bad” times a recession period. 
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2.3. Are multipliers pro or counter cyclical? 
 
One of the main purposes of fiscal policy is to promote cyclical stabilization
11
, 
enabling actual output dynamics closer to that of the potential output. Automatic 
stabilizers together with a discretionary fiscal policy are instruments to achieve this 
purpose. So, fiscal policy should be, essentially, countercyclical. In recessions 
policymakers should implement expansionary fiscal policies to stimulate the economy, 
and in expansions they should implement contractionary fiscal policies to avoid 
economic overheating and control for public deficits. 
But are fiscal multipliers higher in recessions than in expansions? In what 
follows we will try answer this question based on both theoretical and empirical 
literature, although this issue still remains rather unexplored. One reason for the scarce 
literature on this matter is that conventional macroeconomic models are close to linear 
in the neighborhood of potential output. This property implies that the economy behaves 
similarly in recessions and in expansions. However, in the last years, a new class of 
models has been developed and most of them rely on non-linearity in the vicinity of the 
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. In these models, the economy behaves 
differently during recessions when the zero lower bound is reached. However, in most 
of the recessions the zero lower bound does not hold and, thus, the economy behaves as 
in expansions. 
Relying on the available literature, there are non-unambiguous effects of cycle 
phases on the size of fiscal multipliers. For instance, the uncertainty generated in a 
period of crisis probably induces to increase precautionary saving, reducing the 
marginal propensity to consume and the size of multipliers.  
On the other hand, the deleveraging effects during recessions is likely to increase 
the proportion of credit constrained consumers and firms, raising the size of multipliers. 
In recessions prices are less flexible than in expansions and this can also increase the 
size of multipliers. For example, using a model with monopolistic competition, 
Woodford (2011) shows that the presence of either real or nominal rigidities increases 
multipliers. Price rigidities increase multipliers because firms respond to increases in 
aggregate demand not only by increasing prices but rather through increasing output. 
                                                 
11
 Traditional additional roles of fiscal policy are the promotion of income redistribution and the provision 
of public goods. 
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Leeper et al. (2011) show that the presence of price rigidities increases impact 
multipliers by six percentage points. This is not a very large amount, but the effect 
remains in the long-term (cumulative) multipliers. The presence of wage stickiness has 
similar effects because the real wage may remain constant, or even falls during 
recessions, while average labor productivity increases. 
The role of “confidence” of households and firms is also very important when 
comparing the role of fiscal stimulus in recessions with that occurring during “normal” 
times
12
. While in “normal” times confidence does not react significantly to unexpected 
increases in government spending and spending multipliers are in the neighborhood of 
one, in recessions confidence reacts by more and spending multipliers are significantly 
larger (Barsky and Sims, 2012). This occurs because in downturns spending shocks 
leads to a persistent increase in the amount of government investment relative to 
government consumption which is, in turn, reflected in higher confidence. 
Bachmann and Sims (2011) assess the importance of confidence on spending 
multipliers in recessions against “normal” times through estimating a VAR with and 
without a confidence variable in different phases of the cycle. 
Table 3 shows the results found, considering two different measures for the 
confidence variable: “consumer confidence” for households’ expectations and “CEO 
confidence” for businesses expectations. 
 
                                                 
12
 In this context “normal” times refers to a non-recession period. 
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Table 3: Government spending multiplier according to the state of economy 
 
State of economy 
“normal” times “recessions” 
Actual 
Without 
confidence 
Actual 
Without 
confidence 
Consumer 
Confidence 
Impact 
multiplier 0.684 0.765 0.388 0.260 
Max 
multiplier 0.759 0.770 3.08 0.260 
CEO 
Confidence 
Impact 
multiplier 0.967 0.990 1.019 0.835 
Max  
multiplier 1.223 0.991 2.498 0.835 
Source: Bachmann and Sims (2011).
13
 
 
From results shown in Table 3, the authors find evidence that confidence effects 
turn multipliers in recessions larger than those in expansions, especially when 
considering cumulative effects on output. The reverse occurs when confidence effects 
are absent. 
Michaillat (2012) proposed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
macroeconomic model that, in contrast to conventional models, is nonlinear in the range 
of activity seen in the data. The nonlinear behavior across cycle phases is motivated by 
the pressures of matching frictions in the labor market. A consequence of the 
nonlinearity is that the economy behaves differently in recessions and expansions and, 
in particular, that an increase in government consumption reduces unemployment much 
more in recessions than in expansions. 
Simulations of the model calibrated to U.S. data indicate that the government-
consumption multiplier doubles when unemployment rises from 5% to 8%. Moreover, 
in countries where higher portion of government consumption expenditures corresponds 
to compensation of public employees (e.g., in the U.S. this item represents around 2/3 of 
                                                 
13
 The “Actual" column corresponds to the standard VAR specification, and the following “Without 
Confidence" column is the multiplier when the response of confidence is held fixed. The numbers have 
the interpretation as the dollar impact on output (either on impact – “Impact Multiplier” – or the 
maximum effect – “Max Multiplier” – over 16 quarters) for a one dollar increase in spending.  
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government consumption expenditures) the counter-cyclical behavior of multipliers is 
more pronounced. 
Michaillat (2012) defends that fiscal policy is more effective in recessions than 
in expansions because an increase in government consumption stimulates aggregate 
employment not because it stimulates employment in the private sector, but because the 
government hires workers to the public sector. 
In expansions, the competition to hire unemployed workers is intense. By 
posting vacancies, the government takes job applicants away from existing vacancies. 
Firms are required to post additional vacancies to attract applicants, but posting 
vacancies is costly so the marginal cost of labor rises and firms reduce employment 
significantly. Hence, the crowding out of private employment by public employment 
almost totally offsets the increase in public employment when unemployment is low. 
In recessions, an increase in government consumption reduces unemployment 
effectively because public employment does not crowd out private employment as 
much. By posting vacancies when unemployment is high, the government brings job 
applicants out of unemployment, who would not find a job otherwise. Since the 
government does not take applicants away from existing vacancies, firms do not need to 
post additional vacancies, the marginal cost of labor remains the same, firms maintain 
the same level of employment, and there is barely any crowding out. 
In a recent paper, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) also assess fiscal policy 
effectiveness across cycle phases. They apply the Smooth Transition VAR (STVAR) 
procedure to data for a large number of OECD countries and a semi-annual frequency, 
covering the period from 1985 to 2010.
14
 They estimate the effects from an 
unanticipated one percent increase in government spending across cycle phases. To 
identify the phase of business cycle they use a direct projection method that allows the 
multiplier to vary smoothly with the state of the economy. They define a recession as a 
period when the detrended unemployment rate is particularly high, and an expansion as 
a period when the detrended unemployment rate is particularly low. They find that the 
government spending multiplier is countercyclical. On average, the government 
spending multiplier over 3 years is about 2.3. In recessive phases “the response of 
output in the recessionary regime is robustly positive up to two years” (Auerbach and 
                                                 
14
 STVAR is a specific econometric tool adequate to assess the effectiveness of fiscal policy across cycle 
phases. 
20 
 
Gorodnichenko, 2012, p.11) and the multiplier is quite large, of around 3.5. In contrast, 
in expansionary phases, the multiplier is much weaker, even negative at some horizons, 
but not significantly different from zero. The same results apply, qualitatively, to the 
impacts on private consumption (and investment): in recessions, the multiplier is 
robustly positive up to two years, of 2.5 (1.5), while, during expansions, the multiplier 
is negative but not statistically different from zero. As for total employment, while an 
increase in government spending promotes employment during recessions, it has no 
effect on employment during expansions. 
Cogan et al. (2010) found that the government spending multiplier is smaller the 
larger the expected duration of fiscal stimulus. To an expected duration of the fiscal 
stimulus of 4 quarters after the end of a financial disturbance, the multiplier falls below 
one, while to an expected duration of 10 quarters or more the multiplier is negative. In a 
scenario of a permanent increase in the level of government purchases the multiplier is 
strongly negative (-5). This also confirms the counter cyclical nature of the multiplier. 
Canzoneri et al. (2012), employing a variant of the Curdia-Woodford model of 
costly financial intermediation, also show that fiscal multipliers are strongly 
countercyclical, estimating that they can take values exceeding two during recessions, 
declining to values below one during expansions. Their sample covers quarterly data for 
U.S. from 1982Q3 to 2008Q4. 
Finally, Tagkalakis (2008) also find that, in the presence of liquidity constraints, 
fiscal policy have asymmetric effects on consumption across cycle phases: fiscal policy 
is more effective in stimulating consumption during recessions as liquidity constrained 
individuals are more likely to consume all the disposable income change. This result is 
empirically supported for a panel of 19 OECD countries, using annual data from 1970 
to 2002. 
 
A particular case of recessive environment - the interest rate zero lower bound 
scenario
15
 
 
As stated before, non-linear behavior in the workings of an economy has been 
recently introduced in models through mimicking the situation of a zero lower bound 
for interest rates. 
                                                 
15
 This environment is also often identified with the “liquidity trap” scenario in the relevant literature. For 
instance, in the IS-LM-BP framework, “liquidity trap” situations are formally represented by a horizontal 
LM curve. 
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When monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on the short-term 
nominal interest rate the effectiveness of monetary policy is null. In this scenario, the 
sensitivity of money demand to interest rate is infinite, meaning that increases in money 
supply fail to affect nominal (and real) interest rates. In this environment fiscal policy 
has a strong effect on aggregate output: the nominal interest rate does not rise in 
response to fiscal stimulus, thus no crowding out applies, and fiscal stimulus is 
associated with increased inflation expectations. 
Eggertsson (2011) argues for positive effects on output from temporary 
increases in government spending or from temporary tax cuts in the awake of a financial 
crisis, directly aimed at stimulating aggregate demand rather than aggregate supply, 
such as an investment tax credit or a cut in sale taxes. In contrast, tax cuts on wages or 
cuts in capital taxes have a negative effect on output. While the former generate an 
increase of deflationary pressures, the latter encourage people to save instead of 
spending.  
Through using a standard new-Keynesian model calibrated to match the U.S. 
economy, Eggertsson (2011) calculates fiscal multipliers under two alternative 
environments: a zero interest rate and a positive interest rate.  
Table 4 sums up his results, confirming that, with exception of payroll taxes, 
multipliers are larger under a “liquidity trap” scenario. 
 
Table 4: Fiscal multipliers in zero lower bound vs. positive interest rate 
 Positive interest rate Zero interest rate 
Payroll tax multiplier -0.1612 1.0191 
Capital tax multiplier 0.0013 0.1012 
Government spending multiplier 0.4652 2.2793 
Sales tax multiplier -0.5139 -2.5179 
Source: Eggertsson (2011). 
 
Christiano et al. (2011) studied the impact of financial crisis that originates a 
pronounced recessionary impact on output, combined with expansionary monetary 
policies that result in a zero lower bound on policy rates. They found that a multiplier 
above 2 for government purchases is possible to be achieved at the zero lower bound, in 
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the context of a theoretical New Keynesian model calibrated to match a large number of 
features of postwar U.S. data. 
Cogan et al. (2010) also argue that an increase in government purchases during a 
period in which the interest rate is zero, which is expected to last for the current quarter 
only - implying no change in expected future income or inflation -, has a multiplier of 
exactly 1. So, a value of around 2.3 for the temporary government spending obtained by 
Eggertsson (2011) and Cogan et al. (2010) means that 1.0 of this is due to the increase 
in government purchases during the current quarter, while the other 1.3 results from 
higher anticipated government purchases in the future. 
More recently Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011) through NK models 
obtained similar results, confirming that multipliers are considerably larger if monetary 
policy is constrained by the zero lower bound. 
 
 
2.4. Do multipliers change during fiscal consolidation periods? 
 
The study of how periods of fiscal consolidation shape the size of fiscal 
multipliers is meaningful because such scenario represents an example of a structural 
policy regime shift and also because potential non-Keynesian effects may arise. 
Moreover, in the sequence of the recent global economic and financial crisis, most of 
developed countries are now struggling against unsustainable public debt paths. 
In an environment characterized by intertemporal optimization, large fiscal 
imbalances and high risk premium on interest rates can make fiscal expansions to have 
contractionary effects: consumers’ and investors’ confidence decreases as fiscal 
expansion reinforces fiscal sustainability concerns. Similarly, a credible fiscal 
consolidation - that aims at lowering the public debt-to-GDP ratio in a permanent way - 
can lead to an improvement of agents’ expectations about future fiscal policy and, thus, 
an improvement in expected future income. In such scenario, fiscal multipliers value are 
expected to be negative or close to zero. 
Moreover, a fiscal consolidation scenario is an example of a negative permanent 
shock. Literature shows that permanent measures deliver higher multipliers than 
temporary measures in interventions that work through income (e.g., changes in direct 
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taxes), while the reverse is true for interventions operating through prices (changes in 
indirect taxes or in investment taxes) because changes in relative intertemporal prices 
are more likely to affect intertemporal consumption patterns, (Spilimbergo et al., 2009). 
So, one should expect different size (even different sign) for multipliers in 
periods of fiscal consolidation relative to those when no consolidation applies. 
Moreover, as some different consolidation strategies impinge differently on the success 
of reducing debt permanently, it is expectable that the underlying fiscal multipliers 
differ for successful consolidation processes relative to unsuccessful ones.
16
 
Based on the arguments previously reviewed, during a fiscal consolidation the 
size of first year multipliers is larger if the fiscal consolidation is based on government 
expenditures – and government investment in particular –, if the measures taken are not 
credible and of temporary nature, if agents are not financially constrained and if no 
reduction on real interest rates occurs alongside with the fiscal shock. Moreover, these 
effects are also larger if consolidations are implemented at the same time worldwide. 
The composition of consolidation is non-neutral to long-term output, with tax-
based consolidations being less supportive of long-term growth (European Commission, 
2012). 
Also, relying on the literature reviewed in the previous subsection, when a 
consolidation process delivers a recession, as automatic stabilizers represent a larger 
weight, multipliers for discretionary fiscal policy would turn out to be smaller during 
debt-correcting periods. Additionally, a recessive environment feeds-back to the debt-
to-output ratio in proportion of the latter (the larger the debt, the larger the impacts of 
growth on the debt service); thus larger indebtedness is expected to produce smaller 
fiscal multipliers during consolidations. The same effect is expected if confidence 
breaks occur during recessions; in contrast, nominal and real rigidities and zero lower 
bound scenarios are expected to amplify multipliers. 
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 In the literature, there are several ways to identify periods of successful fiscal consolidation. For 
instance, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) define a successful fiscal consolidation episode if it brings down 
the debt to GDP ratio by at least 4.5% of GDP in the three years following a consolidation episode. 
Instead, according to the European Commission (2007), a fiscal consolidation is successful if the 
following condition applies: in the three years after the end of the consolidation episode the CAPB does 
not deteriorate by more than 0.75% of GDP in cumulative terms compared to the level recorded in the last 
year of the consolidation period. In other words, at least half of the overall minimum fiscal correction 
required to qualify as consolidation has to be safeguarded three years after. 
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However, fiscal adjustments have, in general, a negative, but small, impact on 
economic activity. Even expansionary non-Keynesian effects from expenditure cuts can 
emerge in the medium run as a result of anticipated effects of higher future disposable 
income or profitability (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010).
17
 
This suggests that non-Keynesian responses of private consumption are more likely 
when changes in fiscal policy are large and persistent. 
Expansionary effects of fiscal consolidations can go through both demand and 
supply-side channels. Demand-side channel works through positive wealth effect 
(expectations of an increase in lifetime disposable income, relishing liquidity 
constraints) or through interest rate effect (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). The 
implementation of a credible consolidation program (e.g., subject to supra-national 
rules, under the surveillance of a fiscal council or with substantial political costs), 
reducing risk premium on government securities, may lead to general fall in interest 
rates and crowding-in effects from private investment. Falling real interest rates lead to 
a decrease in public interest payments which can eventually lead to a decrease in future 
tax rates; supply-side effects may arise, contributing positively to support growth. 
Moreover, the responsiveness of long-term interest rates to substantial consolidation is 
likely to be stronger at high debt levels (OECD, 2010). 
Alesina and Ardagna (2010) argue that supply-side channels entail expansionary 
effects of fiscal consolidations to work via labor market: tax increases and/or spending 
cuts impact on the individual labor supply as it affects the unions’ fall-back position 
under imperfectly competitive labor markets - lower wage bargaining power of unions 
impinge positively on profits, investment and competitiveness of the private sector. 
Supply-side effects are expected to be larger when consolidations operate through cuts 
in the government wage bill, while tax-based consolidations are found to be less 
supportive of long-term growth, (European Commission, 2012). 
Alesina and Ardagna (2010), using annual data for OECD countries from 1970 
to 2007, identify episodes of expansionary effects on output after a fiscal consolidation 
(non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy). Considering that an episode of fiscal 
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 Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy have been re-interpreted in sequence of the recent global 
financial crisis. Recently, several authors as Perotti (2011) concluded that this output expansion typically 
reflects exchange rate depreciation and a relaxation of monetary conditions rather than confidence effects 
per se arising from fiscal tightening. 
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adjustment is expansionary if the average growth rate of GDP, in difference from the 
G7 average (weighted by GDP weights), in the first period of the episode and in the two 
years after, is greater than the value of 75th percentile of the same variable empirical 
density in all episodes of fiscal adjustments, they identified 26 episodes of expansionary 
periods during fiscal adjustments (3.7% of the observations of the entire OECD 
sample). 
OECD (2010) provides an analysis of the dynamics of public debt of the 
Member States and makes recommendations to correct this situation when countries 
face an unsustainable path. Results show that, for countries with no stabilized debt, 
policy authorities must compromise to achieve a primary fiscal surplus quantified in 
0.5% of GDP. This means an improvement of the primary fiscal balance for the OECD 
countries quantified in 5.25% of GDP, on average, until 2025. This adjustment would 
allow the stabilization of the public debt-to-GDP at 110% (average of OECD countries). 
The OECD Global Model simulations suggest that fiscal consolidations are typically 
contractionary in the short run and expansionary only after two to four years. 
Sustainable output increases are expectable between 4 and 5 years after the beginning of 
the fiscal consolidation, due to a decrease of risk premium and, consequently, a 
decrease in average interest rates. Considering expenditure ranking, results confirm 
those of general literature: 2 years after the beginning of the process, multipliers 
between 0.9 and 1.1 are found for public investment, 0.4 to 0.7 for public transfer to 
households and 0.5 to 0.9 for public consumption. As for the revenue side, up to 2 years 
after starting consolidation, the multiplier for indirect taxes is comprised between -0.2 
and -0.4 and between -0.4 and -0.7 to personal income taxes.  
 These results support most of empirical evidence, which suggests that 
consolidations based on expenditure side rather than on the revenue side tend, in 
general, to be more long-lasting and more growth-supporting in the medium-term, but 
more recessive in the short-term (Alesina et al., 2012). There is a trade-off between 
short-run pain and long-run gain. The pain arises from the negative multiplier effects of 
lower spending or higher taxes, while the gain stems from the lower world interest rates 
and lower distortionary taxes associated with lower debt levels. The results on both pain 
and gain are subject to important qualifications such as the design of a fiscal package; if 
the tightening is well designed with favorable long-run incentives to investment and 
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labor supply, then the short-term pain only arises in the presence of an initial lack of 
credibility and only lasts for the non-credibility period. If, on the other hand, the fiscal 
tightening is badly designed, for example, sharply raising taxes on income or cutting 
essential government investment, the long run gain could be much lower or even 
nonexistent as higher distortions and/or productivity losses offset the gains from lower 
real interest rates (European Commission, 2012). 
Typically, long-term growth is what matters to ensure fiscal sustainability; 
however, recently, financial markets are focusing in short-term growth due, for instance, 
to markets’ beliefs that a country facing a sizeable decline in GDP is unlikely to sustain 
its fiscal adjustment effort over time or due to some degree of short-termism by market 
agents following several years of heightened market uncertainty, (European 
Commission, 2012). This behavior contributes to smaller fiscal multipliers. 
OECD (2010) also emphasizes the importance of several features that influences 
the consolidation effort and, also, the size of the fiscal multipliers: privatization 
revenues or the implementation of structural reforms to promote economic growth in 
the medium-term. In fact, fiscal consolidation processes are often associated with the 
implementation of structural reforms (e.g., enhancing competition in goods, service and 
labor markets that result in improvements in efficiency and competitiveness of the 
economy – supply-side effects). Since the purpose of structural reforms is to allow an 
increase in potential output, potentially leading to higher output growth rates in the 
medium/long-term, and given that successful consolidations may have other structural 
impacts on affecting interest-rate risk premium or expectations, fiscal multipliers may 
crucially differ (being smaller) during these episodes. 
Favero et al. (2011) estimate a Global VAR (GVAR) for a sample of fifteen 
countries, using annual data from 1978 to 2009. In this paper they identify cases in 
which the government implements tax hikes or spending cuts (at the general 
government level) in order to primarily reduce the budget deficit and put public finances 
on a sustainable path. The strategy to identify cases in which the government 
implements meaningful tax hikes or spending cuts is designed by the “narrative 
approach” to identify the fiscal shocks. This approach identifies episodes based on fiscal 
policy actions motivated by deficit reduction, as described in several policy documents, 
irrespective of the outcomes. "Narrative shocks" are identified on the exam of intentions 
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and actions as described in policy documents to identify measures motivated primarily 
by deficit reductions. Such fiscal actions represent a response to past decisions and past 
economic conditions rather than to prospective conditions. This paper includes also 
variables, such as the initial public debt-to-GDP ratio, trade openness and spillovers 
which are not included in others papers. The main conclusion from their results is that 
there is not an unconditional fiscal multiplier. The effect of fiscal policy on output is 
different according these several factors, i.e., during consolidations, depending on 
different debt dynamics, different degrees of openness, etc.  
At last but not the least it is important refer the effect of consecutive 
consolidations. If consolidations are repeated, especially in periods where multipliers 
are large and persistent, in presence of continued myopic behavior of financial markets, 
can have counterintuitive dynamics, i.e., in this situation it is possible that the scenario 
consolidation-debt increase-consolidation-further debt increase takes place as long as 
the current multiplier is high enough to induce further short-term debt-to-GDP increases 
in response to consolidation (European Commission, 2012). 
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3. Methodology and data 
 
Among the relevant literature we found three main methodologies that can be 
used to assess the effectiveness of fiscal policy: large structural macroeconomic models 
such as DSGE models, case studies as in Romer and Romer (2010) and Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) approaches. 
Macroeconomic model simulations, frequently, have an underlying aggregate 
demand/aggregate supply structure characterized with little forward looking behavior as 
far as decisions by households and firms that anticipate future changes in government 
policies is concerned. These frameworks deliver positive impacts on output by 
construction in response to an increase/decrease in public spending/revenue. The 
multipliers obtained are small or negative only if fiscal sustainability is in question, 
economic agents are substantially forward looking or when monetary policy is not 
accommodative enough. See, for example Smets and Wouters (2003), Laxton and 
Pesenti (2003) and Ratto et al. (2009). 
Case studies are based in the identification of real experiments, e.g., episodes of 
truly exogenous fiscal expansions. Romer and Romer (2010) is one of most reputational 
papers using this approach, applied to study the impacts of changes in tax policy. An 
important feature of case studies is that the results obtained are specific to the type of 
fiscal measure studied and, for example, the prevailing macroeconomic conditions at the 
time of implementation. 
Another methodology usually found in the literature for the assessment of the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy is, as already mentioned, the VAR approach. Such as in 
the case studies, the VAR methodology is based in the correct identification of 
exogenous movements in public expenditure or taxes. VARs give the response of the 
economy, taking implicitly into account the monetary policy response and thus the 
effects on the interest rates (whether or not interest rates are included in the VAR), to 
fiscal shocks. See, for example, Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
and Burriel et al. (2010). 
In this work we intend to estimate the fiscal multipliers for the Euro area as a 
whole through using a VAR approach. In this context, and in what follows, we will 
present the model and model extensions to be estimated, after previously characterizing, 
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in brief, the VAR methodology. Additionally, we provide the description of all variables 
and as well as the respective data sources. 
 
 
3.1. VAR methodology 
 
The usual representation of a reduced VAR model takes the following form: 
 
    ∑      
 
   
                        
 
where the n-dimensional vector X includes the endogenous variables of interest (e.g., 
public spending, output, taxes) and    is the nxn matrix of coefficients. The optimal 
number of included lags, k, can be determined by a priori evidence on the behavior of 
the variables or through some information criteria such as the Schwarz or Akaike 
criteria. The vector of reduced-form residuals,   , is n-dimensional with the variance-
covariance matrix ∑e, where E[    
    . 
The reduced-form residuals capture three components: automatic stabilizers, 
discretionary fiscal policy responses (active changes in the tax rates or in public 
expenditure for stabilization purposes) and random discretionary fiscal policy 
responses. The latter is what a structural fiscal shock is meant to capture. 
The structural VAR model takes the following form: 
 
      ∑  
 
   
                           
 
where the matrix    describes the contemporaneous relationships among the variables 
in the vector   . The matrix B describes the relation between the reduced-form residuals 
   and the structural-form residuals   : 
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The dynamics of the variables following a one unit increase in the current value 
of the structural residual in the equation respecting a fiscal variable, holding all other 
residuals fixed (that is a “structural fiscal shock”), can be summarized in the impulse 
responses of the variables included in the system. 
The crucial challenge is how to pin down the structural shocks. To compute the 
impulse responses of the variables in the system, the matrices   , B and the variance-
covariance matrix of the structural residuals (∑v) must be estimated. However, the 
system can be identified only if some coefficients in the matrices       are restricted 
to take certain values typically justified by theoretical considerations (“identifying 
assumptions”). Even with the assumption that the matrix B is the identity matrix, this 
exclusion restriction is not enough to identify the system. The diagonal matrix ∑v can be 
used to express ∑e as follows   
  ∑v (  
      ∑e. Still, this relation does not identify a 
unique solution. 
As previously referred the crucial point to estimate VAR is identify structural 
fiscal policy shocks. In the literature there are four approaches to identify structural 
fiscal shocks. The recursive formulation (Cholesky decomposition) approach proposed 
by Sims (1980); the structural identification (SVAR) approach proposed by Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002); the sign restriction proposed by the approach developed by Uhlig 
(2005) and the narrative (or dummy variables) approach proposed by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1999). 
According the recursive formulation approach, the first variable ordered in the 
system responds only to its own exogenous shock. In the simplest three dimensional 
VAR model used to assess fiscal policy multipliers, including spending, output and 
taxes, spending is ordered first, meaning that government spending is assumed not to 
contemporaneously react to shocks to the economy. The second variable, output, 
responds to the first variable (spending) and to its own shock. The third variable, taxes, 
reacts to its own shock and shocks to the previous two variables. Following this 
approach, the matrix    is a triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal, and the 
matrix B is the identity matrix. 
[
   
     
       
] [
         
       
      
]   [
   
   
   
] [
         
       
      
]                     
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In this context, the ordering of the variables plays a crucial role because it 
defines the direction of causal relationship between them. Although, there is no 
theoretical guide for ordering the variables, and the assumptions behind any ordering 
are nontrivial. For instance, positioning taxes after output excludes a priori 
contemporaneous effects of taxes on any component of output, including private 
consumption, which is a rather strong assumption. 
According the structural identification approach, some elements of the matrix 
      can be obtained by using information on the elasticities of output relative to 
spending and taxes. These elasticities correspond to certain elements in the matrix   . 
These values are exogenously imposed in the VAR model. The system takes the 
following form: 
 
[
   
       
     
] [
         
       
      
]   [
   
   
     
] [
         
       
      
]                    
 
where    ,     and     are, respectively, the value of the elasticities of output relative 
to government spending and net taxes, and the elasticity net taxes relative to output.  
The crucial assumption needed in this identification approach is that government 
spending does not react within a period time, typically assumed to be a quarter, to 
shocks to the economy. This is based on the idea that fiscal actions are subject to the 
decision lags, e.g., the time needed for fiscal policy makers to respond to the status of 
the economy. Also, estimating    while setting    = 0 implies that spending decisions 
come before tax decisions.  
In contrast with the two previous approaches, the sign restriction approach does 
not require imposing zero contemporaneous effects on some variables, but requires 
restrictions on the sign of the impulse responses of the fiscal variables. For example, 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) identify a government spending shock as a shock that is 
orthogonal to monetary and business cycle shocks, and for which government revenue 
increases for four quarters after the shock.. Hence, they impose also sign restrictions on 
revenue increases to identify monetary and business cycle shocks. 
The fourth and last approach to identify structural fiscal shocks is the narrative 
(or dummy variables) approach, which is particularly implemented in studies focusing 
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in the U.S. economy. Ramey and Shapiro (1999) and Ramey (2011) construct a dummy 
capturing dates of exogenous increases in government defense spending, according, for 
instance, to information in official documents. Romer and Romer (2010) apply the idea 
to legislated tax changes. The fiscal shock is identified by the impulse response to the 
date dummy. Specifically, the new reduced form VAR is: 
 
    ∑        ∑  
 
   
 
   
                          
 
where j is the lag order associated with the dates dummy d, and D is the associated 
matrix of coefficients. The disadvantage of this approach is that other fiscal shocks of 
different implications might have occurred parallel to the identified episodes. 
One of the main criticisms on the VAR literature, is that VAR models cannot 
properly account for the fact that changes in government spending and taxes can be 
anticipated due to legislative and implementation lags (Leeper et al., 2008); in this case, 
the effects of the fiscal shock would appear in the economy since the moment agents 
anticipate government decisions. If agents are forward looking, VAR models may fail to 
correctly estimate fiscal shocks, thereby leading to biased estimates of their effects and, 
in particular, of fiscal multipliers. 
This is the so-called "fiscal foresight problem". The debate on this issue is still 
open as Ramey (2011) finds that fiscal foresight is a relevant issue inducing a bias on 
estimates of fiscal multipliers, contrary to the previous findings of Perotti (2005). 
Bouakez et al. (2010) show that Ramey’s results are most likely driven by the data 
points relative to the Korean War episode only, and thus should not be considered of a 
general relevance.
18
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Technically, Ramey (2011) provides evidence that SVAR-based innovations in the US as identified in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) can be anticipated and Granger-caused by Ramey and Shapiro (1999) war 
episodes. However, Perotti (2005) finds little evidence that SVAR-based innovations are predictable. In 
turn, Bouakez et al. (2010) show that, the fiscal foresight problem is not severe enough to preclude the 
use of SVAR innovations as correct measures of unanticipated fiscal shocks as Ramey's results are driven 
by the Korean War episode. 
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3.2. Model specification and data 
 
In order to make an empirical application to the Euro area, we aim, first, at 
estimating average fiscal multipliers, assessing overall revenue and expenditure 
multipliers as well as disaggregated fiscal multipliers, considering different items on 
both the revenue and the expenditure side. 
In terms of the aggregate model, the baseline VAR definition as specified in 
equation (3.1.1) includes three endogenous variables in (log) first differences - 
government spending (DELTA_SPENDING), output (DELTA_GDP), tax revenues 
(DELTA_TAXES) - and an (exogenous) constant term (C). We also include an 
additional endogenous variable, the long term interest rate 
(REAL_INTEREST_RATE_10) as to control for debt service since government 
spending refers only to primary expenditure, as in, e.g., Burriel et al. (2010). 
We followed the recursive formulation (Cholesky decomposition) as the 
approach to identify structural fiscal shocks. In particular, the ordering of Cholesky 
decomposition is SPENDING, GDP, TAXES and REAL_INTEREST_RATE_10. This 
means that output responds contemporaneously to changes in public spending but public 
spending does not respond to changes in output. Also, output contemporaneously affects 
tax revenues but the converse is not true. This is because the political process implies 
substantial delays between the design and the implementation of changes in the tax rates 
which, at the margin, would affect output and to the fact that consumption and 
investment plans take some time to adapt to a policy even after being enacted. Last but 
not the least, we consider that long term real interest rate responds contemporaneously 
to changes in others variables but the converse is not true. 
In terms of the disaggregate model, main VAR estimation contains eight 
endogenous variables in (log) first differences – SPENDING disaggregation into 
government transfers (DELTA_GTRA), government intermediate consumption 
(DELTA_GICO), government wages (DELTA_GWAG) and government investment 
(DELTA_GINV), GDP, TAXES disaggregated into social security payments 
(DELTA_SS), direct taxes (DELTA_TDIR) and indirect taxes (DELTA_TIND) -, the 
long term real interest rate and a constant term. The ordering of the Cholesky 
decomposition is GTRA, GICO, GWAG, GINV, OUTPUT, SS, TDIR, TIND and 
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REAL INTEREST_RATE_10, following the assumptions considered in the aggregate 
model. 
Relying on Favero et al. (2011), we also control, for the aggregate data, for the 
effects of the degree of openness and of the debt level on fiscal multipliers. As argued 
before, we expect that the larger the leakages to imports, the smaller fiscal multipliers 
are. So, we include the degree of openness as an exogenous variable 
(OPENNESS_TRADE_DEGREE) as to check if the impacts on the multipliers are, 
indeed, as expected. Moreover, we also control for the debt-to-output ratio because 
policy makers have different preferences on debt-stabilization levels and horizons since 
they face an intertemporal budget constraint (e.g., Favero and Giavazzi 2007, Leeper, 
2010). Burriel et al. (2010) found that fiscal multipliers are larger and more persistent 
when fiscal stress is accounted for, meaning that sustainability concerns crucially 
reduce the efficiency of fiscal policy. Thus, we have also included the changes in the 
debt-to-output ratio (DELTA_DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO) as an endogenous variable as 
to capture debt dynamics. 
Data on these variables were collected on an annual basis for a panel of all the 
17 member-countries of the Euro area (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain), from 1998 to 2008.
19
 Data is defined in real terms 
(thousands millions of Euros) and respects, in particular, to the definitions provided in 
AMECO – see Annex A.1., for details. 
Additionally, VAR specifications, either with aggregate and disaggregated fiscal 
data, are to be separately estimated across cycle phases (recessions and expansions) as 
well as when comparing periods of sustainable fiscal consolidation with those where no 
such structural shift occurs. The aim is to assess how the cycle or some structural shifts 
affect the size of multipliers. 
As regards to the identification of cycle phases, we followed the deviations 
approach and computed the output gap by detrending the GDP series by parsimoniously 
                                                 
19
 Quarterly data on fiscal variables is not available for all the Euro area countries. Even studies using 
Euro area data on a quarterly basis (e.g., Burriel et al., 2010) rely on a “constructed” intra-annual 
interpolation due to Paredes et al. (2009). Thus, for all the Euro area countries, the only data available is 
annual. We use 1998 as a starting year because the convergence admission criteria have already been 
established by then. The year 2008 was set as a final year of our sample as to exclude the economic and 
financial crises; the inclusion of the recent years in such a small sample would certainly produce biased 
results, counterproductive relative to regular empirical evidence. 
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using the Hoddrick-Prescott filter provided in the Eviews 7.1 toolbox. The sample is, 
accordingly, split into two: one subsample including the observations in which the 
output gap is positive (expansions) and the other comprising periods of negative output 
gap (recessions). Data on the identification of expansionary and recessive periods is 
provided in Annex A.2., using AMECO. 
A strategy similar to that followed to control for openness was used to evaluate 
the impacts on the size of fiscal multipliers from fiscal consolidation efforts: the VAR is 
augmented with a dummy binary variable that assumes the value of 1 if the period 
belongs to a fiscal consolidation process, and 0 otherwise. In the literature, there are 
several ways to identify periods of fiscal consolidation. For instance, Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010) define a fiscal consolidation episode as a year when occurs an 
improvement of the cyclically-adjusted primary budget (CAPB) of at least 1.5% of 
GDP. Alternatively, the OECD defines the start of a fiscal consolidation episode as an 
improvement in the CAPB by at least one percentage point of potential GDP in one year 
or, in two consecutive years, with at least a 50 basis points improvement occurring in 
the first of the two years. The fiscal consolidation continues as long as the CAPB 
improves. An interruption is allowed without terminating the episode as long as the 
deterioration of the CAPB does not exceed 30 basis points of GDP and is more than 
offset in the following year (by an improvement of at least 50 basis points of GDP). The 
consolidation episode stops if the CAPB stops increasing or if the CAPB improves by 
less than 20 basis points of GDP in one year and then deteriorates. 
Since our application is to the Euro area, to identify fiscal consolidation episodes 
we followed a third approach - the European Commission (2007) criterion. According 
to this criterion, a fiscal consolidation episode is identified with an improvement of the 
CAPB of at least 1.5% of GDP which is either achieved (i) in one single year or (ii) 
over a period of three years where in each single year the improvement of the CAPB is 
less than 1.5% of GDP and the CAPB does not deteriorate by more than 0.5% of GDP 
compared to the previous year. Data on the identification of consolidation periods is 
provided in Annex A.3., using AMECO. 
Before providing and analyzing the estimation results, a few preliminary tests on 
the model specification are in order. First of all, VAR methodology requires variables to 
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be stationary. We proceed with the ADF - unit root test on the above mentioned 
variables, using Eviews built-in tools. 
 For the core specification, Table 5 shows that long-term real interest rate and 
taxes are stationary in levels, while public spending and output are stationary in first 
differences of log-levels. 
 
Table 5: Unit-root tests on core variables of the model - aggregate fiscal variables, 
full sample 
 
Level 
(p-value) 
1
st
 differences 
(p-value) 
Log(Spending) 0.9971 0.0000 
Log(GDP) 0.1605 0.0006 
Log(Taxes) 0.0032 0.0181 
Real Interest Rate 10 years 0.0000 0.0000 
Delta Debt to GDP ratio 0.0002 0.0000 
 
A second step to model specification is choosing the optimal number of lags to 
apply in the VAR. Using the Schwarz criterion we confirm that the number of lags that 
minimize the statistic test is one (see Table 6, below), as expected.  
 
Table 6: Optimal number of lags - aggregate fiscal variables, full sample 
Number of lags Schwarz 
1 -8.885986 
2 -8.769394 
3 -8.694972 
4 -7.970372 
8 -7.449543 
 
So, all the endogenous variables in the VAR also appear lagged once. Finally, 
we also perform the VAR stability test. A VAR model must satisfy the stability 
condition, that is, all the roots of the characteristic polynomial should be less than one in 
modulus.  
Table 7 exhibits the test performed using the 5 endogenous variable VAR model. 
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Table 7: VAR stability test - aggregate fiscal variables, full sample 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: DELTA_SPENDING  DELTA_GDP DELTA_TAXES REAL_INTEREST_RATE_10  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 1 
Date: 09/23/12   Time: 10:00 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.669530  0.669530 
 0.295140  0.295140 
 0.200786 - 0.053218i  0.207719 
 0.200786 + 0.053218i  0.207719 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
  
From Table 7, we conclude that the VAR specification satisfies the stability 
conditions. Stability tests were also performed for the VAR model using disaggregated 
fiscal variables, holding similar (not reported) results.
20
  
                                                 
20
 All non reported results are available upon request. 
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4. Estimation results 
 
In this section we compute fiscal multipliers resulting from VAR estimations 
under the specifications with both aggregated and disaggregated fiscal variables. 
Multipliers are computed using all observation in the sample and also considering 
subsample: recession vs. expansion. Moreover, we control, to aggregated and 
disaggregated fiscal variables, for the effect of fiscal consolidation and, to aggregated 
fiscal variables, for the effect of the degree of openness and the debt dynamics on the 
size of fiscal multipliers. Results are critically analyzed by comparing them with those 
predicted by the literature reviewed in section 2, above.  
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4.1. Global Analysis 
 
Results from VAR estimation using aggregated fiscal variables are reported in 
Table 8, below. 
Table 8: Estimation results - aggregated fiscal variables, full sample. 
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At a 5% significance level, all variables are globally significant for all the four 
equations. Specifically, F-statistic > F critical value (4,175) = 2.423.
21
 In VAR models, 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients is not trivial because each endogenous 
variable is explained by other lagged variables that result from other equations of the 
model. Indeed, the most appealing interpretation is given through the analysis of the 
impulse response functions. 
Figure 1 shows the accumulated impacts on DELTA_GDP to shocks in 
DELTA_SPENDING and DELTA_TAXES, respectively. 
 
                                                 
21
 F critical value was computed by using the function = @qfdist(0.95, 4,175) in Eviews 7.1 software. 
41 
 
Figure 1: Accumulated impulse response functions of DELTA_GDP to shocks in 
DELTA_SPENDING (left-hand side) and DELTA_TAXES (right-hand side), full 
sample. 
 
 
 
Public spending, overall (excluding debt service expenditure) impinges 
negatively on impact, but the cumulative impact on output is positive. Taxes, as 
expected, have (both impact and cumulative) negative impacts on output. 
By normalizing the impulse response functions considering a one percentage 
point shock to public spending and taxes, we compute the accumulated fiscal multipliers 
on aggregate fiscal variables. In particular, multipliers are computed by dividing the 
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accumulated responses of GDP to a 1 standard deviation shock in public spending (or 
taxes) by the impact response of public spending (or taxes) to its own shock – this gives 
the elasticity of output relative to public spending (or taxes). Thus, public spending (or 
taxes) multiplier results from dividing the corresponding elasticity by the average 
weight of public spending (or taxes) on output. 
Table 9 shows the results and they respect to the changes in output induced by a 
euro unit shock in the fiscal instrument.
22
  
 
Table 9: Cumulative fiscal multipliers, full sample - public spending vs. taxes. 
Period Public Spending Taxes 
1 -0.077 
23
 0 
2 -0.065 -0.108 
3 -0.031 -0.185 
4 -0.003 -0.3 
5 0.017 -0.255 
6 0.03 -0.269 
7 0.038 -0.279 
8 0.044 -0.285 
9 0.048 -0.289 
10 0.05 -0.291 
Source: own calculations 
 
Table 10 shows the estimation results for the VAR using disaggregated fiscal 
variables. 
                                                 
22
 Throughout the text, similar computations were made for different disaggregation of fiscal instruments 
or for different periods of analysis. 
23
 E.g.,       
        
       
       ⁄ . IRF values of output and public spending to a 1 standard deviation 
shock in public spending are available upon request. 
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Table 10: Estimation results - disaggregated fiscal variables, full sample. 
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At a 5% significance level, all variables are globally significant for all the nine 
equations. Specifically, F-statistic > F critical value (9,175) = 1.934.
24
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the cumulative responses of GDP growth to shocks 
in the growth rate of different items of public spending and revenue, respectively. 
 
Figure 2: Accumulated impulse response functions of DELTA_GDP to shocks in 
disaggregated items of DELTA_SPENDING, full sample. 
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 F critical value was computed by using the function = @qfdist(0.95, 9,175) in Eviews 7.1 software. 
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Figure 3: Accumulated impulse response functions of DELTA_GDP to shocks in 
disaggregated items of DELTA_TAXES, full sample. 
 
On the expenditure side, transfers are the main driving force for the overall 
expenditure dynamics (cf. responses to DELTA_GTRA with those to 
DELTA_SPENDING, above in Figure 1). Moreover, wages exhibit negative impacts on 
output while, positive effects are driven by shocks in public investment and 
intermediate consumption. On the revenue side, all items impinge negatively on output 
growth.  
Table 11 shows the computed multipliers for different spending and revenue 
items. Values refer to cumulative multipliers per period. 
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Table 11: Cumulative fiscal multipliers, full sample - disaggregated public 
spending vs. disaggregated taxes. 
Period 
Public Spending Taxes 
GTRA GICO GWAG GINV SS TDIR TIND 
1 -0.353 0.25 -0.6 1.62 0 0 0 
2 -0.391 0.245 -0.382 1.579 -0.313 -0.369 0.171 
3 -0.256 0.499 -0.163 1.663 -0.56 -0.636 -0.108 
4 -0.14 0.609 -0.137 1.845 -0.628 -0.762 -0.383 
5 -0.081 0.632 -0.136 1.993 -0.66 -0.849 -0.522 
6 -0.042 0.657 -0.121 2.095 -0.7 -0.92 -0.595 
7 -0.009 0.686 -0.103 2.171 -0.735 -0.975 -0.648 
8 0.016 0.709 -0.089 2.228 -0.76 -1.014 -0.689 
9 0.035 0.726 -0.079 2.272 -0.778 -1.043 -0.72 
10 0.049 0.739 -0.072 2.304 -0.792 -1.065 -0.742 
Source: own calculations. 
 
As previously referred, the literature frequently points that government spending 
multiplier is higher than tax multiplier and that an increase in GDP can be obtained 
through an increase in government spending or a decrease in taxes. Our results, using 
aggregated fiscal data, do not satisfy the first stylized fact. Tax cumulative multiplier is 
higher than government spending cumulative multiplier (in modulus 0.291 vs. 0.05); the 
same applies to impact multipliers with values (in modulus) of 0.108 and 0.077, 
respectively. The second stylized fact is only partially supported by the results. While, 
on impact and cumulative terms, an increase in GDP can be obtained by a decrease in 
taxes, as far as government spending multiplier is concerned, an increase in total public 
spending produces positive impacts on output only in cumulative terms, on impact the 
effects are negative. Theoretical literature and empirical evidence, ceteris paribus, do 
not support this last result, especially, because many government spending packages are 
directed to agents that face liquidity constraints and so, use this increase in disposable 
income to smooth consumption or pay debts. 
It is also important to refer that the values of the multipliers are low 
comparatively with others obtained through similar methodology (see Table 1, section 
2). However, the analysis regarding the effects of disaggregated expenditure and 
revenue on output provides some insights to previous results. 
As far as government spending multiplier is concerned, the component with the 
highest positive effect on output is public investment (GINV), delivering impact and 
cumulative multipliers of 1.62 and 2.304, respectively. Public investment is, frequently, 
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directed to infrastructures or to the qualification of human resources that bring positive 
effects, not only at the time when these measures are implemented but, also, in the 
longer run, either directly or indirectly, by increasing the productivity of private 
inputs.
25 
Intermediate consumption (GICO) also has a positive effect on GDP at all-time 
horizons, exhibiting multipliers of 0.25 on impact and of 0.739 in cumulative terms. On 
the other hand, results obtained relative to compensation of public employees (GWAG) 
and transfers (GTRA) have negative effects on output, at least on impact. According to 
the literature, while in the long run increases in government wages can lead to 
distortions in the labor market between public and private sector with negative impact 
on employment, and thus on output (confirming the negative cumulative multiplier of 
0.072), the negative value obtained for the impact multiplier is counterintuitive because 
an increase in wages leads to increases in disposable income of beneficiaries and 
through smoothing consumption behavior we should expect this value to be positive. 
Negative impact values could result if households acknowledge such expenditures as 
spurious and to be fully financed, in the very near future, with taxes. 
Results on transfer multipliers are also counterintuitive: GTRA exhibit a 
negative impact multiplier (-0.353), but positive contributions arise during the third year 
after the shock (note that the multiplier starts increasing in period 3, Table 11). 
 Using quarterly data, Burriel et al. (2010) also finds similar evidence for the Euro area: 
an initial positive impact on output is reversed after some quarters and net positive 
impacts arise only within 30 to 40 quarters, in accordance to the dynamics in Table 11. 
An increase in government transfers has, frequently, the same effects of a decrease in 
direct taxes: transfers increase the level of real disposable income, and hence of 
consumption. One explanation is that transfers work as automatic stabilizers and, in the 
very short run may exhibit a strong negative correlation with output (reverse causality); 
the stabilization role of transfers becomes less pronounced as time passes. 
The effects of these latter instruments differ, however, if transfers include 
pension payments and other transfers that are taxable and, hence, some of the increase 
in incomes is absorbed through an increase in tax payments. According to the literature, 
a 1% of nominal GDP cut in transfers has a smaller multiplier effect than a 1% of 
                                                 
25
 There is an extensive literature on the productivity of public capital, basically following the seminal 
work of Aschauer (1989). 
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nominal GDP increase in direct taxes. The same applies, at least in cumulative terms, in 
our case. 
As far as taxes are concerned, it is important to distinguish the mechanisms 
operating through the social security contributions/direct taxes multipliers and those 
operating through indirect taxes multiplier. While in first case an increase in SS/TDIR 
taxes induces a reduction in the level of real disposable income and, thus, in 
consumption, an increase in TIND induces a rise in the price level, erodes the real value 
of wealth and this may also reduce current consumption. The relative importance in 
each country of real wealth and real disposable income to consumption decisions will 
influence the relative size of the two tax multipliers. So, in countries with higher degree 
of consumption smoothing (smaller liquidity constraints), it is expected that the 
dynamic effects from wealth are more important and, consequently, that the size of 
indirect tax multiplier is larger relative to the direct tax multiplier. Moreover, indirect 
tax rates have a more effective role as a stabilizer. Our results show that SS and TDIR 
multipliers are higher than TIND multiplier (impact multipliers of -0.313 and -0.369, 
respectively, against a positive multiplier of 0.171 and cumulative multipliers of -0.792 
and -1.065, respectively, against -0.742). This suggest that there is not a significant 
degree of consumption smoothing (due, for instance, to higher liquidity constraints) in 
these countries. 
In what follows, we complement the global analysis with the assessment on how 
the degree of openness and debt dynamics influences the size of the fiscal multipliers. 
We restrict our analysis to the case of VARs using aggregated fiscal variables only. 
 
Openness degree and the size of fiscal multipliers in the Euro area 
 
In order to assess how the openness degree affects the size of the multipliers we 
have included in the VAR, as an exogenous variable, the ratio of total exports plus total 
imports (of goods and services) relative to GDP. The assumption is that the trade 
integration is a structural characteristic of the economy and that, at least in the short-run 
is not influenced either by GDP growth or by changes in fiscal instruments. Instead, as 
referred before, it shapes the magnitude of fiscal shocks on output. Estimation results 
are shown in Table 12, below. 
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Table 12: Estimation results controlling for openness degree - aggregated fiscal 
variables. 
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Table 13 presents the fiscal multipliers comparing the estimated results from the 
baseline model (VAR without the OPENNESS_TRADE_DEGREE variable) with those 
obtained when trade openness is considered. 
 
Table 13: Cumulative fiscal multipliers, controlling for openness degree – public 
spending vs. taxes. 
Period 
Public Spending Taxes 
With trade 
openness 
Without trade 
openness 
With trade 
openness 
Without trade 
openness 
1 -0.067 -0.077 0.000 0 
2 -0.040 -0.065 -0.091 -0.108 
3 -0.003 -0.031 -0.149 -0.185 
4 0.023 -0.003 -0.179 -0.3 
5 0.040 0.017 -0.194 -0.255 
6 0.050 0.03 -0.202 -0.269 
7 0.057 0.038 -0.206 -0.279 
8 0.060 0.044 -0.209 -0.285 
9 0.063 0.048 -0.210 -0.289 
10 0.064 0.05 -0.211 -0.291 
Source: own calculations. 
 
The multipliers after controlling for openness cannot be interpreted as 
multipliers under openness; rather they refer to the remaining effects on the multipliers 
after having “isolating” the impacts on output resulting from changes in trade 
integration.
26
 Accordingly, public spending multipliers, both on impact as well as in 
cumulative terms, are larger in the new specification relative to baseline – this means 
that openness has a negative impact on the size of multipliers, as when we control for its 
effects on output multipliers are larger. This goes for the literature since the larger the 
leakage to imports, the smaller the multiplier. However, in the case of taxes, the reverse 
occurs. This may be due to the negative impacts of the tax burden on external 
competitiveness: the more open the economy is, the larger the impacts on net exports 
from cost increases due to tax hikes.
27
 
 
                                                 
26
 See Burriel et al. (2010) on this interpretation when a variable capturing financial stress is included, as 
exogenous, in the model. 
27
 We have computed estimations controlling, instead, for the openness degree as measured by the 
imports-to-output ratio. Conclusions are virtually the same with the leakage on imports having stronger 
effects on the spending multiplier (while having smaller impacts on the tax multiplier) compared with the 
model controlling for overall (exports+imports) openness degree. Results are available on request. 
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Debt dynamics and the size of fiscal multipliers in the Euro area 
 
As for assessing the impacts arising from including debt dynamics, we have re-
estimated the baseline VAR allowing for the change in public debt as percentage of 
GDP (DELTA_DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO) as an endogenous variable. Unlike openness, 
the dynamics of this variable both determines and is determined by the remaining 
endogenous variables in the model. On the one hand, policymakers follow different 
underlying behavior towards debt stabilization when setting fiscal policy; moreover, 
debt influences output as the need to satisfy intertemporal government budget constraint 
puts pressure on future taxes and thus, shapes current consumption and saving 
decisions. On the other hand, real interest rates and output growth feedback on debt 
stabilization, and the same happen, by definition, with shocks in fiscal instruments. 
Estimation results for the augmented VAR are displayed in Table 14. As can be 
seen from the table, specific Cholesky decomposition considers the changes in the debt-
to-output ratio as the last variable: changes in debt respond contemporaneously to 
changes in all the other variables, but the converse does not hold. 
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Table 14: Estimation results controlling for debt dynamics - aggregated fiscal 
variables. 
 
Table 15 presents the fiscal multipliers corresponding to the above model 
specification (with debt) compared with those from baseline model (without debt). 
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Table 15: Cumulative fiscal multipliers, controlling for debt dynamics – public 
spending vs. taxes. 
Period 
Public Spending Taxes 
With debt Without debt With debt Without debt 
1 -0.08 -0.077 0.000 0 
2 -0.072 -0.065 -0.107 -0.108 
3 -0.053 -0.031 -0.176 -0.185 
4 -0.044 -0.003 -0.209 -0.3 
5 -0.043 0.017 -0.226 -0.255 
6 -0.043 0.03 -0.235 -0.269 
7 -0.045 0.038 -0.240 -0.279 
8 -0.046 0.044 -0.244 -0.285 
9 -0.046 0.048 -0.246 -0.289 
10 -0.047 0.05 -0.247 -0.291 
Source: own calculations. 
 
From Table 15: we can see that both expenditure-side and revenue-side 
multipliers are smaller with debt: an unit-euro increase in public consumption increases, 
in cumulative terms, output by 0.05 euros after 10 years while considering the negative 
impact on the budget constraint it reflects, instead, in a fall in output of 0.047 euros. The 
same occurs with taxes: a tax decrease impinges negatively on debt accumulation and, 
thus, output expands by less compared with the no-debt-feedback scenario. The results 
prove the role of the intertemporal budget constraint on shaping a “more Ricardian” 
behavior on economic agents. Favero et al. (2011) have also found similar results: for 
an initial fiscal retrenchment of 1% of GDP, the model without feedback produces a 
larger output retrenchment than the one obtained with the debt-feedback model. 
 
 
4.2.  Multipliers across cycle phases 
 
After concluding on the different size of Euro area fiscal multipliers depending 
on the different fiscal instruments, we propose now to assess how the cycle phases 
shape the size of fiscal multipliers, i.e., if fiscal policy is expected to be more efficient 
during recessions than during expansions, as the literature generally argues. 
Table 16 and Table 17 show the estimation results for aggregate fiscal variables 
for the subsamples of expansionary and recessive periods, respectively. Corresponding 
accumulated impulse response functions of output are plotted in Figure 4 and Figure 5 
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and cumulative fiscal multipliers comparing expansions with recessions are presented in 
Table 18.  
 
Table 16: Estimation results - aggregated fiscal variables, expansions. 
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Table 17: Estimation results - aggregated fiscal variables, recessions. 
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Figure 4: Accumulated impulse response functions of DELTA_GDP to shocks in 
DELTA_SPENDING (left-hand side) and DELTA_TAXES (right-hand side), 
expansions. 
 
 
Figure 5: Accumulated impulse response functions of DELTA_GDP to shocks in 
DELTA_SPENDING (left-hand side) and DELTA_TAXES (right-hand side), 
recessions. 
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Table 18: Cumulative fiscal multipliers, expansions vs. recessions -  public 
spending vs. taxes. 
Period 
Public spending Taxes 
Expansions Recessions Expansions Recessions 
1 -0.167 0.037 0 0 
2 -0.192 0.062 -0.076 -0.15 
3 -0.18 0.085 -0.121 -0.285 
4 -0.167 0.104 -0.139 -0.382 
5 -0.158 0.117 -0.144 -0.447 
6 -0.152 0.127 -0.144 -0.49 
7 -0.148 0.133 -0.143 -0.52 
8 -0.146 0.138 -0.141 -0.538 
9 -0.144 0.14 -0.14 -0.55 
10 -0.142 0.142 -0.138 -0.56 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Taking into account the two subsamples to distinguish between cycle phases, 
estimation results show that in recessions government spending multiplier is positive 
while in expansions is smaller, inclusively, negative (impact multipliers of 0.037 and -
0.167, respectively; cumulative multipliers of 0.142 and -0.142, respectively). This 
smaller value in expansions is in line with theoretical literature and empirical evidence. 
Relatively to tax multiplier, the effectiveness of this instrument is, also, higher in 
recessions: in both cumulative terms and on impact (impact multipliers are -0.15 in 
recessions, against -0.076 in expansions; cumulative multipliers are, respectively, of -
0.56 and -0.138). Apparently, in the Euro area as a whole, the larger values for fiscal 
multipliers during recessions suggest that fiscal policy purely targeted to stabilization 
concerns would, on average, produce a fiscal surplus bias. 
As expected, the same conclusions can also be drawn using disaggregate fiscal 
variables. Table 19 and Table 20 show estimation results and Figure 6 and Figure 7 
show the corresponding accumulated responses of output in expansions and recessions, 
respectively, considering disaggregated fiscal data. 
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Table 19: Estimation results - disaggregated fiscal variables, expansions. 
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Table 20: Estimation results - disaggregated fiscal variables, recessions. 
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Figure 6: Accumulated impulse response functions of DELTA_GDP to shocks in 
disaggregated items of DELTA_SPENDING and DELTA_TAXES, expansions. 
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Figure 7: Accumulated impulse response functions of DELTA_GDP to shocks in 
disaggregated items of DELTA_SPENDING and DELTA_TAXES, recessions. 
 
 
 
 
Table 21 and Table 22 compare, respectively, disaggregated expenditure and 
revenue multipliers, under expansions and recessions. 
 
Table 21: Cumulative fiscal multipliers, expansions vs. recessions - disaggregated 
public spending. 
Period Expansions Recessions 
GTRA GICO GWAG GINV GTRA GICO GWAG GINV 
1 -0.561 -0.04 -0.767 2.554 -0.118 0.43 0.317 0.232 
2 -0.669 -0.348 -0.869 3.435 -0.243 0.465 1.047 -1.199 
3 -0.586 0.072 -0.876 3.792 -0.063 0.426 1.984 -1.697 
4 -0.472 0.119 -0.969 4.223 0.241 0.679 2.235 -2.055 
5 -0.429 0.164 -1.047 4.601 0.428 0.834 2.433 -2.287 
6 -0.409 0.138 -1.105 4.929 0.548 0.917 2.636 -2.442 
7 -0.396 0.146 -1.128 5.17 0.643 0.981 2.813 -2.562 
8 -0.38 0.158 -1.14 5.36 0.72 1.04 2.945 -2.65 
9 -0.364 0.172 -1.146 5.507 0.779 1.09 3.039 -2.716 
10 -0.352 0.182 -1.153 5.63 0.822 1.125 3.112 -2.766 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table 22: Cumulative fiscal multipliers, expansions vs. recessions - disaggregated 
taxes. 
Period Expansions Recessions 
SS TDIR TIND SS TDIR TIND 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 -0.688 -0.258 0.391 0.238 -0.479 -0.081 
3 -1.316 -0.519 0.261 0.548 -0.775 -0.453 
4 -1.637 -0.64 0.028 0.918 -1.029 -0.709 
5 -1.823 -0.689 -0.119 1.268 -1.209 -0.896 
6 -1.967 -0.712 -0.147 1.541 -1.366 -1.026 
7 -2.101 -0.738 -0.135 1.738 -1.493 -1.126 
8 -2.219 -0.765 -0.122 1.885 -1.586 -1.206 
9 -2.314 -0.787 -0.119 2 -1.655 -1.266 
10 -2.389 -0.804 -0.119 2.088 -1.708 -1.311 
Source: own calculations. 
 
In disaggregated terms, as far as spending side is concerned, most of the 
multipliers are in line to what happens in aggregated terms. A single counterintuitive 
result emerges regarding the GINV multiplier: in expansions, the value of the multiplier 
is larger than in recessions, reaching 5.63 in the positive phases of the cycle while being 
even negative in downturns (-2.766). Apparently, during recessions, public investment 
policies fail to stimulate output, possibly because they are of less productive nature, or 
even harmful.  
On the revenue it is important to notice that, in cumulative terms, in recessions, 
the GDP response to a change in direct taxes is approximately the double than that 
occurring in expansions (-1.708 vs. -0.804) being this effect even larger in the case of 
indirect taxes which values are of -1.311 in recessions vs. -0.119 in expansions. 
However, evidence shows that changes in social security contributions work strongly 
pro-cyclically: in recessions, multipliers range from 0.238 to 2.088 while, under 
expansions, a 1 euro rise in SS leads to a decrease in output of 2.389 euros in 
cumulative terms. One possible explanation for the stronger negative impact during 
expansions may be the non-linear behavior of labor supply, exhibiting higher wage 
elasticity in low-unemployment times. 
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4.3. Multipliers during debt-consolidation periods 
 
A last empirical question that we aim to answer is how structural breaks, such as 
fiscal consolidation efforts, are meaningful for the effectiveness of fiscal policy. In this 
regard, we have proceeded in a similar way as with the control for openness. We have 
included in the VAR a dummy variable, as exogenous. The dummy takes the value of 1 
if the period is considered as one under the effort of a fiscal consolidation process, and 
is recorded zero otherwise. The assumption is that consolidation is a particular structural 
environment that may affect, relying on literature, the multipliers. Classification of 
periods as of consolidation draws on the European Commission (2007) criteria as 
described in section 3, above. 
Table 23 shows the estimation results for the VAR using aggregate fiscal data 
and controlling for consolidation periods. Corresponding fiscal multipliers are presented 
in Table 24. 
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Table 23: Estimation results controlling for consolidation periods- aggregated 
fiscal variables. 
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Table 24: Cumulative fiscal multipliers, controlling for consolidation – public 
spending vs. taxes. 
Period 
Public Spending Taxes 
With dummy 
for 
consolidation Baseline 
With dummy 
for 
consolidation Baseline 
1 -0.046 -0.077 0 0 
2 -0.016 -0.065 -0.122 -0.108 
3 0.024 -0.031 -0.203 -0.185 
4 0.055 -0.003 -0.248 -0.3 
5 0.077 0.017 -0.273 -0.255 
6 0.091 0.03 -0.288 -0.269 
7 0.100 0.038 -0.297 -0.279 
 8 0.107 0.044 -0.303 -0.285 
9 0.111 0.048 -0.307 -0.289 
10 0.114 0.05 -0.310 -0.291 
Source: own calculations 
 
Using aggregate fiscal data, Table 24 shows that when controlling for 
consolidation periods, spending multipliers (both on impact and in cumulative terms) 
and revenue-side multipliers (at least in cumulative terms, from the 4
th
 year onwards) 
are higher than in the baseline model. These results show that consolidation periods 
produce negative impacts on the size of multipliers, as expected – a one-euro cut in 
public spending or a one-euro increase in taxes, has less impacts on reducing output 
during a consolidation than otherwise. Moreover, cuts in spending appear to be the most 
adequate instrument for achieving a fiscal consolidation with smaller impacts on output 
– cumulative spending multiplier almost doubles when we control for consolidation. 
Table 25 shows the estimation output for disaggregated variables and the 
corresponding multipliers are compared to those in the baseline model in Table 26 and 
Table 27.  
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Table 25: Estimation results controlling for consolidation periods – disaggregated 
fiscal variables. 
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Table 26: Cumulative fiscal multipliers, controlling for consolidation – 
disaggregated public spending. 
Period With dummy for consolidation Baseline 
GTRA GICO GWAG GINV GTRA GICO GWAG GINV 
1 -0.352 0.274 -0.606 1.736 -0.353 0.25 -0.6 1.62 
2 -0.384 0.278 -0.409 1.727 -0.391 0.245 -0.382 1.579 
3 -0.258 0.485 -0.198 1.808 -0.256 0.499 -0.163 1.663 
4 -0.152 0.549 -0.144 1.935 -0.14 0.609 -0.137 1.845 
5 -0.097 0.558 -0.115 2.049 -0.081 0.632 -0.136 1.993 
6 -0.059 0.573 -0.086 2.136 -0.042 0.657 -0.121 2.095 
7 -0.028 0.591 -0.060 2.201 -0.009 0.686 -0.103 2.171 
8 -0.005 0.607 -0.040 2.249 0.016 0.709 -0.089 2.228 
9 0.012 0.619 -0.024 2.285 0.035 0.726 -0.079 2.272 
10 0.024 0.627 -0.012 2.311 0.049 0.739 -0.072 2.304 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Table 27: Cumulative fiscal multipliers, controlling for consolidation – 
disaggregated taxes. 
Period With dummy for consolidation Baseline 
SS TDIR TIND SS TDIR TIND 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
2 -0.310 -0.369 0.215 -0.313 -0.369 0.171 
3 -0.552 -0.626 -0.169 -0.56 -0.636 -0.108 
4 -0.618 -0.752 -0.512 -0.628 -0.762 -0.383 
5 -0.652 -0.839 -0.688 -0.66 -0.849 -0.522 
6 -0.690 -0.908 -0.785 -0.7 -0.92 -0.595 
7 -0.722 -0.960 -0.852 -0.735 -0.975 -0.648 
8 -0.746 -0.998 -0.902 -0.76 -1.014 -0.689 
9 -0.763 -1.025 -0.939 -0.778 -1.043 -0.72 
10 -0.776 -1.046 -0.966 -0.792 -1.065 -0.742 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Looking at disaggregated fiscal variables, results seem also of interest for policy 
making: apparently, and among the several sources of revenues, a reduction in indirect 
taxes is the most recommended. For all the remaining revenue items, the impact on 
output is estimated to be higher during consolidations. 
On the spending side, reducing transfers and intermediate consumption has 
stronger impacts on output during consolidations, while reducing public investment or 
wages has lower impacts on output during consolidation processes. Reducing public 
wages exhibits even stronger non-Keynesian effects during consolidation periods. This 
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last result is clearly supported by the theoretical literature on non-Keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy.
28
 
  
                                                 
28
 See, for example, Alesina et al. (2002) and Ardagna (2007). 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In the current context where the limited role for monetary policy instruments 
apparently endows fiscal policy with higher effectiveness, European fiscal policy 
authorities are rather constrained by the fact of most countries being struggling against 
recessions together with the need to put public finances in a sustainable path. In this 
context, we aimed at assessing how large are fiscal multipliers in Europe and for 
different fiscal policy instruments. Moreover, we intended to contribute to the (rather 
sparse) literature on the size of multipliers across cycle phases and under fiscal 
consolidation episodes. 
After a literature review on the mechanisms through which fiscal policy affects 
output, evidence is presented for the Euro area, relying on a VAR model with pooled 
annual data for the current seventeen country-members, from 1998 to 2008. 
Estimation results show that, on average, public spending in the Euro area 
impinges negatively on impact, but the cumulative impact on output is positive, while 
taxes, as expected, have (both on impact and cumulative) negative impacts on output. 
However, both multipliers obtained are smaller comparatively to those recorded in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. One possible explanation may be related to the non- 
accommodative monetary policy from the ECB, reflecting price stability concerns. 
On the expenditure side, transfers are the main driving force for the overall 
expenditure dynamics; moreover, wages exhibit negative impacts on output while 
positive effects are strongly driven by shocks in public investment and, to a lesser 
extent, by intermediate consumption. On the revenue side, all items impinge negatively 
on output growth. Additionally, our results support that the openness degree reduces the 
effectiveness of public spending while it positively affects the size of the taxes 
multiplier. The latter result may reflect the negative impacts of the tax burden on 
external competitiveness. We have also found that, when the VAR is augmented by an 
endogenous variable capturing debt dynamics, both revenue- and expenditure-side 
multipliers are smaller; this proves the role of the intertemporal budget constraint on 
shaping a “more Ricardian” behavior on the European economic agents. 
To assess how the size of fiscal multipliers changes across cycle phases, the 
sample was divided in two subsamples: one subsample including the observations in 
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which the output gap is positive (expansions) and the other comprising periods of 
negative output gap (recessions). Estimation results show that public spending 
multiplier is positive in recessions while in expansions is smaller, inclusively, negative. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of the taxes multiplier is, also, higher in recessions. 
Last but not the least, controlling for consolidation periods, the size of overall 
public spending and taxes multipliers is higher than in baseline scenario – consolidation 
phases affect negatively the size of the multipliers. Moreover, cuts in spending appear to 
be the most adequate instrument for achieving a fiscal consolidation with substantially 
smaller impacts on output than in times of no-consolidation. Looking at disaggregated 
fiscal variables, a reduction in indirect taxes should be the measure most recommended 
to policymakers, on the revenue side. For all the remaining revenue items, the impact on 
output is estimated to be higher during consolidations. On the spending side, reducing 
transfers and intermediate consumption has stronger impacts on output during 
consolidations, while reducing public investment or wages has lower impacts on output 
during consolidation processes. Reducing public wages exhibits even stronger non-
Keynesian effects during consolidation periods. 
We are aware, however, that these results should be carefully interpreted 
because of both technical and theoretical limitations of the analysis. On the one hand, 
we have chosen a parsimonious VAR model with recursive formulation to identify 
structural shocks; the other strategies, in spite of being more appealing, would have 
been substantially more time-consuming and would, in certain cases, further reduce the 
already small number of observations in the sample. Moreover, regime-switching VAR 
models that allow for smooth transitions across states would probably be more suitable 
for computing multipliers in recessions and expansions (e.g., Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko, 2012). From a theoretical point of view, analyzing fiscal shocks in the 
context of an international panel entails several drawbacks. Formally, fiscal policy in 
the Euro area is country-specific; thus, fiscal policy mechanisms operate with different 
intensity in different countries, fiscal policy authorities have different preferences on 
fiscal policy mixes, on debt stabilization relative to cycle stabilization and policy 
responses are not immune to international policy spillovers. For instance, Favero et al. 
(2011) found that a fiscal consolidation has different impacts whether it is implemented 
by a single country or contemporaneously by a set of highly integrated countries. The 
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analysis of fiscal multipliers is probably more useful for policy makers if it relies only 
on observations for a specific country, although of difficult implementation for all the 
European countries, due to sparse data since the Euro involvement. 
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Appendix 
 
Keynesian spending and tax multipliers (closed economy) 
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where     Gross Domestic Product;  
    Planned Expenditure  
    Autonomous Aggregate Expenditure; 
   Private Consumption; 
   Government Spending; 
    Planned Private Investment; 
   Marginal Propensity to Consume; 
  = Income Taxes; 
t = Income Tax Rate; 
R = Transfers from Government to private sector.  
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Annexes 
 
A.1. List of variables used in estimations
29
 
Variable Description 
REAL_ INTEREST_ RATE_10 
      (
     
       
   )       
ILN - Nominal long-term interest rates (national data 
weighted with current GDP in ECU/EUR) 
PVGD - Price deflator gross domestic product at 
market prices (average of national growth 
rates weighted with current values in 
ECU/EUR) 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(GDP) 
OVGD - Gross Domestic Product at constant market 
prices (average of national growth rates 
weighted with current values in ECU/EUR) 
SPENDING                      
GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS 
(GTRA) 
                    UUOG 
UYTGH - Social benefits other than social transfers 
in kind (National currency) 
UYTGM - Social transfers in kind supplied to 
households via market producers: general 
government (National currency) 
UYVG - Subsidies: general government (National 
currency) 
UUOG - Other current expenditure: general 
government (National currency) 
GOVERNMENT INTERMEDIATE 
CONSUMPTION 
(GICO) 
 
UCTGI - Intermediate consumption: general 
government (National currency) 
GOVERNMENT WAGES 
(GWAG) 
UWCG - Compensation of employees: general 
government (National currency) 
                                                 
29
 These variables can have been used directly in estimations or indirectly, that is, used to calculate 
variables used in estimations. 
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GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT 
(GINV) 
UIGGO - Gross fixed capital formation: general 
government (National currency) 
TAXES               
SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS 
(SS) 
UTSG - Social contributions received: general 
government (National currency) 
INDIRECT TAXES 
(TIND) 
UTVG - Taxes linked to imports and production 
(indirect taxes): general government 
(National currency) 
DIRECT TAXES 
(TDIR) 
UTYG - Current taxes on income and wealth (direct 
taxes): general government (National 
currency) 
DELTA_DEBT_TO_GDP_RATIO 
                 
UDGG - General Government Consolidated Gross 
Debt (Percentage of GDP at market prices – 
excessive deficit procedure) 
OPENNESS_TRADE_DEGREE 
 
           
    
 
OXGS - Exports of goods and services at constant 
prices  
OMGS - Imports of goods and services at constant 
prices 
 
OVGD - Gross Domestic Product at constant market 
prices (average of national growth rates 
weighted with current values in ECU/EUR) 
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A.2. Identification of cycle phases – Euro area countries 
 Years 
Country Expansions Recessions 
Austria 1999; 2000; 2001; 2006; 2007; 2008. 1998; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005. 
Belgium 1999; 2000; 2001; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008. 1998; 2002; 2003. 
Cyprus 
2000; 2001; 2006; 2007; 2008. 1998; 1999; 2002; 2003; 2004; 
2005. 
Estonia 
2005; 2006; 2007; 2008. 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 
2003; 2004. 
France 
1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 
2008. 
1998; 2003. 
 
Finland 
1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2004; 2005; 2006; 
2007; 2008. 
2003. 
Germany 
2000; 2001; 2002; 2006; 2007; 2008. 
 
1998; 1999; 2003; 2004; 2005. 
Greece 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008. 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002. 
Ireland 
1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 
2007; 2008. 
1998. 
Italy 
2000; 2001; 2002; 2004; 2005; 2006; 
2007; 2008. 
1998; 1999; 2003. 
 
Luxembourg 
2000; 2001; 2002; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008. 1998; 1999; 2003; 2004. 
 
Malta 
1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2007; 2008. 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006. 
 
Netherlands 
1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2006; 2007; 2008. 2003; 2004; 2005. 
 
Portugal 
1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2007; 2008. 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006. 
 
Slovakia 
1998; 2006; 2007; 2008. 
 
1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 
2004; 2005. 
Slovenia 
1999; 2000; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008. 
 
1998; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004. 
Spain 
2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 
2008. 
1998; 1999. 
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A.3. Identification of consolidation periods – Euro area countries 
Country 
Number of fiscal 
consolidation episodes 
Years of fiscal consolidation 
episodes 
Austria 2 2001; 2005. 
Belgium 2 1998; 2006. 
Cyprus 
5 2000; 2004; 2005; 2006; 
2007. 
Estonia 1 2000. 
France 1 1998. 
Finland 3 1998; 1999; 2000. 
Germany 
5 1998; 1999; 2000; 2005; 
2007. 
Greece 1 2005. 
Ireland 4 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006. 
Italy 2 2007; 2008. 
Luxembourg 4 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008. 
Malta 
6 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 
2004; 2005. 
Netherlands 4 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006. 
Portugal 3 2002; 2004; 2006. 
Slovakia 3 1999; 2001; 2003. 
Slovenia 0 - 
Spain 2 1998; 2006. 
 
